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ADJUDICATING CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE FOR THE
CAPITALLY CONDEMNED IN TENNESSEE:
EMBRACING A TRUTH FORUM
DWIGHT AARONS*

Steve Henley was executed early Wednesday, February 4, 2009.1 With his
final words, before the lethal dose entered his veins, Henley stated, "[a]s I've
said, ever since this happened, I did not kill them. ' '2 Did he fatally shoot Fred
Stafford, and shoot Edna Stafford and kill her by setting fire to the Stafford
household? 3 We may never fully know. Henley did not have any new evidence
to which he could point to support his claim of innocence. But even if he did, it
probably would not have mattered because, had he raised the issue in the state
or federal courts, those courts likely would not have adjudicated the merits of
the claim due to procedural bars.4 Had the Governor been asked to grant
clemency based on his innocence, Henley's request would have likely been
denied.5 Thus, an innocent person could possibly be executed in Tennessee.

* Associate Professor, The University of Tennessee College of Law. This is a slightly
expanded (and annotated) version of remarks presented at "A Death Penalty Colloquium: The
Past, Present, and Future of the Death Penalty" at The University of Tennessee College of Law.
I am extremely grateful to Lane McCarty, Symposium Editor, Lesley Mund, Managing
Editor, and James A. Inman, Editor-in-Chief, of the Tennessee Law Review for deciding to
convene the Colloquium and inviting me to participate. Deepest heartfelt thanks to Lesley Mund
and James A. Inman for assistance above and beyond the call of duty. Judy Cornett read and
commented on a draft. Thanks as well to the participants in the Colloquium and their comments
and encouragement, especially Debbie Denno, Lyn Entzeroth, Corinna Lain, Vincent Rabil, and
Penny White. I thank the late Michael Mello for intellectual assistance and hope my efforts
adequately give measure to the idea we shared. I remain responsible for all errors and omissions.
1. Kate Howard, "IDidNot Kill Them," Condemned Man Says, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 3,
2009, at Al.
2. Id.
3. This was the State's theory of prosecution and the jury's finding, based, in part, on the
testimony of Henley's accomplice and co-defendant, Terry Wayne Flatt, who testified pursuant
to a plea deal. See State v. Henley, 774 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. 1989).
4. A procedural bar or procedural default is when the prisoner has failed to comply with
a state court's procedural rule, permitting the state court to refuse to consider the prisoner's
substantive claim. Procedural bars include the waiver of the issue, the issue was previously
determined and that the petition is untimely. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-13-102 (West 2002);
Id. § 40-30-106(g), (h) (West 2008).
5. ABA DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, EVALUATING
FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE TENNESSEE DEATH PENALTY
ASSESSMENT REPORT - AN ANALYSIS OF TENNESSEE'S DEATH PENALTY LAws, PROCEDURES, AND
PRACTICES 223 (March 2007); see also AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO
STOP AN EXECUTION 18 1, app. B (2005).
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This Article proposes a remedy to this deadly defect by suggesting that the
Tennessee General Assembly create a truth forum, which can be either a truth
jury or truth commission. The Article builds on work done by others, namely
the American Bar Association's Death Penalty Implementation Team and its
Report, scholarship on innocence, and an idea proposed by Michael Mello. Part
I describes the process by which Tennessee capital defendants are tried, appeal
their convictions and sentences, and pursue post-conviction relief. It notes the
avenues open for raising the question of innocence. Part II discusses some of
the work of the scholars who have studied the question of innocence. Part III
then introduces the idea of a truth forum and details how it might work to better
ensure that an innocent person is not executed in Tennessee. Part IV discusses
the positives and negatives of placing the truth forum in the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch. Part V concludes.
I. ASSERTING INNOCENCE IN TENNESSEE DURING THE DEATH PENALTY
PROSECUTION AND APPEALS PROCESS

A. General Overview of Tennessee's CapitalTrial,Appellate and PostConviction Processes
Tennessee's capital trial and appellate process, while formally fair and
efficient,6 suffers from some important defects with respect to claims of
innocence. First-degree murder is the only capital crime in Tennessee.7 After
one is officially changed with first-degree murder, the State must decide
whether to seek the death penalty. 8 If the State so chooses, it must then formally
notify the defendant by filing of a motion of intent to seek the death penalty.9
All capital defendants are entitled to capitally ic1ualified counsel, who should
thereafter file all appropriate pre-trial motions.
1. Capital Trial
The capital trial is divided into two parts: the guilt phase and the sentencing
phase.' 1 At the guilt phase the defendant has a right to a jury trial, 12 and at the
end of the proceeding, the jury is to determine whether the prosecution has
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first-

6. See generally Lee Davis & Bryan Hoss, Tennessee's Death Penalty:An Overview of
the ProceduralSafeguards, 31 U. MEM. L. REv. 779 (2001) (providing an overview).
7. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(c)(1) (West 2002).
8. TErN. R. CRim. P. 12.3(b).
9. Id.
10. See TENN. CODE ANN. §40-14-202(a) (West 2008); TENN. R. CRiM. P. 12(b); TENN.
SUP. CT. R. 13(3).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(a) (West 2002).
12. TENN. R. CRIm. P. 23(a).
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degree murder. 13 The jury's verdict of guilty must be unanimous. 14 If the jury
determines that the defendant is not guilty of the capital offense, the jury may
still convict the defendant of a lesser included offense.' 5 In that instance, the
defendant is subjected to non-capital sentencing. 16 If, however, the jury does
find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, then the capital case proceeds
to its sentencing phase.
At the capital sentencing phase the jury will determine the appropriate
sentence for the defendant. There, the jury has option of sentencing the
defendant to death, life without parole, or life imprisonment. 19 For the jury to
impose a death sentence, it has to find that the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance, and the jury has to agree on the presence of that aggravator.
The jury must then consider whether any mitigating circumstances exist.21 It
may also consider testimony concerning the victim and the impact of the
murder on relevant persons. 22A death sentence can only be imposed ifthe jury,
after weighing and considering the aggravating circumstances against the
mitigating circumstances, finds that at least one aggravating circumstance has
been proven and that any aggravating
•
circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt
23
outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Regardless of the sentence imposed,
for every first-degree murder conviction, the trial judge is required to complete
a report, describing the trial and its chronology, the defendant, the victim, the
defense attorneys, and other pertinent information.24
Within 30 days of the entry of the sentencing order, the defendant can
move for a new trial.25 If a party requests, a judge other than the trial judge
would convene the new trial.26 To preserve the issues for appeal, in the new
trial motion the defendant must raise all issues based on the admission or
exclusion of evidence, jury instructions, misconduct by the jury, parties or
attorneys or "other action committed or occurring during the trial ofthe case, or
other ground[s] upon which a new trial is sought. 27 If requested, the court must

13.
2002).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 2009); id. §-204(a) (West

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(a).
TENN. R. CRIm. P. 3 1(d).
Id.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(a) (West 2002).
Id.
Id. § 39-13-204(e)(2) (West 2002).
Id. § 39-13-204(i) (West Supp. 2009).
Id. § 39-13-204(e)(1),(f)(2),(g)(2) (West 2002).
Id. § 39-13-204(c) (West 2002).
Id. § 39-13-204(g)(1)(A) (West 2002).
TEN. SUP. CT.R. 12(1).
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 33(a),(b).
TENN. R. CRiM. P. 33(d).
TENN. R. APP. P. 3(e).
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make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and if the court differs with the
jury on the weight of the evidence, it may grant a new trial.2 8
In sum, the defendant has several pre-trial, trial, and post-trial methods of
raising the issue of innocence. First, innocence can be argued by convincing the
prosecution not to file capital charges. If unsuccessful, the defendant turns to
the capital jury trial as the key forum for raising innocence. At trial, the
defendant traditionally puts the State to its proof, most commonly by pleading
not guilty and invoking the presumption of innocence. The State is then
required to prove the elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable
doubt. During the guilt phase of the trial, the jury, as the trier of fact, is charged
with assessing whether the crime has been proven, and if it so concludes, it
implicitly rejects the defendant's claim of innocence. Once convicted, the
defendant sees the presumption of innocence replaced by a finding of guilt, and
it is the defendant who bears the ultimate burden of establishing his innocence.
The defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal in the trial court. To
prevail, the defendant has to establish that, viewing the evidence is the light
most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found him
or her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon the conclusion of trial court
proceedings, the direct appeal is the next route by which a defendant may seek
to establish his innocence.
2. Direct Appeals
Capital defendants may appeal their conviction and death sentence by filing
an appeal with the Court of Criminal Appeals. 29 The Defendant must file the
notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment or 30 days from the
entry of an order denying the new trial motion, unless the court waives the
filing deadline in the interest ofjustice. 30 The Court of Criminal Appeals, both
when the defendant files a notice of appeal and even if a notice of appeal is not
filed,3' is statutorily required to determine: (1) whether the death sentence was
imposed in an arbitrary fashion; (2) whether the evidence supports the jury's
finding of statutory aggravating circumstances; (3) whether the evidence
support's the jury's finding that the statutory aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances; and (4) whether the death sentence is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering the nature of the crime and the defendant.32
The review of the Court of Criminal Appeals is generally limited to issues
presented for review, but it has the discretion to consider other issues,
especially when necessary to prevent endless litigation, injury to the public's

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 33(c)(3), (d).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (West 2002).
TENN. R. APP. P. 4(a), (c).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(a)(2) (West 2002).
Id. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2002).
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interests and "prejudice to the judicial process. 33 The task of the appellate
court is to correct errors and provide other appropriate relief, and it may affirm,
reverse or order other relief.34 If the Court of Criminal Appeals affirms the
conviction and sentence, the case is automatically forwarded to the Tennessee
Supreme Court for review.3 5
The Tennessee Supreme Court exercises plenary review.36 After the appeal
is docketed and the Court receives the briefs, it is required to review "the record
and briefs and consider all errors assigned., 37 The Court then enters an order
indicating the issues to be addressed at oral argument. 38 The Tennessee
Supreme Court's direct review is similar to that of the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals: it is required by statute to consider the propriety of the death
sentence, including whether the evidence supports the aggravating
circumstances, whether the finding that those circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances, and whether the death sentence is excessive or
disproportionate. 39 Like the Court ofCriminal Appeals, the Tennessee Supreme
Court reviews capital cases primarily for error correction. 40 As the state's
highest court, it is also charged with amplification of the law. The Court may
affirm, reverse, or order other appropriate relief.4' If the Court affirms the
conviction and sentence, it must set an execution date no less than four months
from the date of its judgment.4 2
In short, on direct appeal a capital defendant can raise a claim of innocence
by maintaining that there was insufficient evidence to support the first-degree
murder conviction.43 Under Tennessee law, the conviction will be affirmed if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is
sufficient evidence to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable
doubt.44 The appellate court defers to the trier of fact regarding credibility
determinations and inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 5 On direct
appeal the defendant has to overcome a presumption of correctness in the jury's
verdict. 46 This burden is difficult, designed to respect the jury's determination
of guilt and its sentence.

33.
34.

TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a),(b).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(d)(1),(2) (West 2002); TENN. R. APP. P. 36(a).

35.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (West 2002).

36.

Id. § 39-13-206(d)(1)-(2) (West 2002).

37.

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 12(2).

38.

Id.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-06(c)(1) (West 2002).
40. Id. § 39-13-206(d)(1)-(2) (West 2002).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 40-30-120(a) (West 2008).
43. Id. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (West 2002).
44. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997).
45. Id.
46. Id.
39.
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If the Tennessee Supreme Court affirms the conviction and death sentence,
the defendant has 90 days to file a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court, asserting a violation of his or her federal constitutional rights. 7
To prevail on the innocence claim in the United States Supreme Court, the
defendant must establish that his or her federal constitutional rights were
violated.48 Traditionally, the defendant would assert that his or her right to due
process of law was violated because the State produced insufficient evidence to
support the conviction. 49 The review of the United States Supreme Court is at
its discretion,50 and the federal high court does not sit as an error correcting
court; rather, it is a law pronouncing court. The Court grants review to resolve
conflicts of federal law on issues of national importance. 5' Therefore, a
Tennessee capital defendant has do more than assert that he or she is innocent
of the crime for the United States Supreme Court to grant review; to increase
his or her chances of obtaining review he or she must also maintain that
resolving the issues in the case is of national importance.
3. State Post-Conviction Proceedings
A capital defendant generally must file a petition for post-conviction relief
within one year of the Tennessee Supreme Court's final ruling on the
conviction and sentence. 52 The petition is submitted to the judge who presided
over the trial.53 The petition, which must be verified under oath, must state all
legal grounds and factual allegations supporting the request of post-conviction
relief.4 The petition has to explain why any new legal ground was not
previously raised. Legal grounds that could have been raised previously but
were not are considered waived unless (1) the claim is based on a constitutional
right recognized post-trial and whose retroactive application is required by the
is due to the
state or federal constitution or (2) the failure to raise the ground
55
State's action in violation of the state or federal constitution.

47. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 2101(c)(2009).
48. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1993); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 313-16 (1979).
49. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1979).
50. See SuP. CT. R. 10.
51. Id.
52. For petitions filed after this period the petitioner must establish that the asserted claim
is: (1) based on an appellate court's final ruling establishing a constitutional right not previously
recognized at the time of the trial and that that right is to be retroactively applied; (2) founded
on new scientific evidence establishing that the petitioner is actually innocent; or (3) seeks relief
from a previous sentence, not procured by a guilty plea, used to enhance the challenged sentence
has been declared invalid. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(b)(1)-(3) (West 2008).
53. Id. § 40-30-104(a) (West 2008).
54. Id. § 40-30-104(d) (West 2008).
55. Id. § 40-30-106(g)(1), (2) (West 2008).
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The post-conviction petition may be preliminarily dismissed or the trial
court will enter a preliminary order.16 The post-conviction court will dismiss the7
petition if it determines conclusively that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.1
However, if a preliminary order is entered, counsel may be appointed, and the
State will file a reply.5 8 An evidentiary hearing is held in which the defendant
must prove any disputed factual allegations.5 9 The post-conviction petition will
be granted if the petitioner proves that his or her state or federal constitutional
rights were violated and that the violation made the judgment void or voidable,
thus setting aside the conviction or death sentence. 60 Statutory time limitations
require that the court hearing post-conviction petitions decide them within a
year of their filing.6'
A prisoner is entitled to one post-conviction petition.62 Thereafter, the
petitioner can either move to reopen a previously adjudicated post-conviction
petition or file a successive post-conviction petition.63 If seeking to reopen a
post-conviction petition, the petitioner must establish that the case falls within
one of four narrow exceptions. 64 A defendant can appeal to the Court of
Criminal Appeals from the trial court's denial of a post-conviction petition, the
denial of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, and the denial of
permission to file a second or subsequent petition. The standard of review in
each instance is for abuse of discretion. 66 The appellate court has nine months
from the final submission of the case to decide the appeal.67 The Tennessee
Supreme Court has discretionary review over post-conviction appeals from the
Court of Criminal Appeals.68

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. § 40-30-106(i) (West 2008).
Id. § 40-30-106(i) (West 2008).
Id. § 40-30-108(a) (West 2008).
Id. § 40-30-110(a) (West 2008).
Id. § 40-30-111 (a) (West 2008).
Id. § 40-30-111 (d) (West 2008).
Id. § 40-30-102(c) (West 2008).

63. Id.
64. The petitioner must establish that the newly asserted claim is: (1) based on an
appellate court's final ruling establishing a constitutional right not previously recognized at the
time of the trial and that that right is to be retroactively applied, or (2) founded on new scientific
evidence establishing that the petitioner is actually innocent, or (3) seeks relief from a previous
sentence, not procured by a guilty plea, used to enhance the challenged sentence has been
declared invalid and (4) the facts underlying the claim, if true, would establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the petitioner is entitled to have the conviction set aside or the
sentence reduced. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-117(a)(l)-(4) (West 2008).
65. Id. § 40-30-117(c) (West 2008).
66. Id. § 40-30-117(c) (West 2008).
67. Id. § 40-30-116 (West 2008).
68. SeeTN. Sup. CT. R. 28, § 10(a); TN. R. APP. P. 11(a).
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4. Coram Nobis
A convicted capital defendant may also try to make use of the writ of error
coram nobis.69 In the words of the Tennessee Supreme Court, it is an
"extraordinaryprocedural remedy in this modem regime. It fills only a slight
70
gap into which few cases fall."
The relevant statute provides:
The relief obtainable by this proceeding shall be confined to errors dehors the
record and to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on the
trial of the case, on a motion for a new trial, on appeal in the nature of a writ
of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Upon a showing
by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to present
certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will lie for
subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were
litigated at trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have resulted
in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.7'
Thus, if the issue could have been raised earlier and was not, that issue is
considered waived. If the issue was already litigated in a prior proceeding, it
cannot be relitigated in coram nobis. Coram nobis is not limited to specific
types of errors, and the inquiry on whether to grant it usually is fact intensive. 72
The writ has to be brought within one year of the conviction in the trial court.73
The short statute of limitations may be tolled because of due process
concerns. 74 The only relief the trial judge can order is the setting aside of the
judgment
and a new trial. 75 Appeals can be taken to the Tennessee Supreme
76
Court.

69. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-26-105(a) (West Supp. 2009).
70. State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 672 (Tenn. 1999) (emphasis in original).
71. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-26-105(b) (West Supp. 2009).
72. State v. Hart, 911 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
73. Due to the short limitations period, if the defendant files a petition for writ of error
coram nobis while his direct appeal is pending, he should simultaneously file a motion for a stay
of the appeal until the coram nobis motion is decided. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 672.
74. Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 102-04 (Tenn. 2001); Freshwater v. State, 160
S.W.3d 548, 556-57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).
75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-26-105(c) (West Supp. 2009).
76. Id. But in the Workman litigation, appeals were taken to the Court of Criminal
Appeals and to the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Workman, 41 S.W.3d at 102-03 (reversing
Court of Criminal Appeals' denial of writ of coram nobis as untimely); State v. Workman, 11l
S.W.3d 10, 17-18 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (reviewing trial court's subsequent denial ofwrit of
coram nobis).
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5. Federal Post-Conviction Proceedings

A Tennessee capital defendant can challenge his or her death sentence and
conviction by filing a writ of habeas corpus in the appropriate federal district
court. 7 A federal habeas petitioner can only raise claims that have been
presented in the state courts.78 Claims that have not been presented in the state
courts will be dismissed for failure to exhaust the state court remedies, unless
those claims are clearly meritless.79
a. ProceduralRequirements ofHabeas CorpusReview
To obtain relief the petitioner has to establish that his or her federal
constitutional rights were violated in securing the conviction or sentence.80 In
the habeas petition, the petitioner must identify and raise all possible grounds
for relief and identify the facts supporting each ground.8 ' If the petitioner
challenges a state court's resolution of a factual issue, the petitioner has the
burden of rebutting, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption that the
factual determinations of the state court are correct. 82 If the challenge is based
on the state court's resolution of a legal issue, the petitioner has to establish that
the determination was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme
Court or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in state court.8 3
If the district courtjudge concludes that the petition has stated a colorable
claim for relief, there are limited circumstances in which the court can hold an
evidentiary hearing. A hearing cannot be held if the claim is one in which the
petitioner failed to develop the underlying facts in the state courts unless (1) the
facts support a newly recognized constitutional rule, made retroactive by the
United States Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable, or a factual
predicate could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of
due diligence, and (2) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error,
no reasonable fact finder would have found the petitioner guilty of the
underlying offense. 84 If a hearing is not held, the district judge will decide the
petition without additional evidence.8 5 If there is an evidentiary hearing, the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (2009).
Id. § 2254(b)(1) (2009).
Id. § 2254(b)(1),(2) (2009).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2009).
Id. § 2254(e)(1) (2009).
Id.
Id. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2009).
Id. § 2254(e)(2) (2009).
See RuLE 8(a) OF THE RULES GOVERNING

§ 2254 CASES IN THE U.S. DIST. CT.
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court is to resolve all material factual discrepancies.86 A conditional order of
release will be issued if the petitioner's federal rights were violated in obtaining
the conviction or sentence.
If relief is denied, then the petitioner must obtain a certificate of
appealability from a federal judge.88 Such certificates can only be issued if the
petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. 89 If granted, the Tennessee capital defendant's appeal from the denial of
his or her habeas petition will be decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit will assess the district court's resolution of the
petitioner's claims. 90 If unsuccessful, the petitioner may file a second or
successive habeas petition by convincing a panel of Sixth Circuit judges to
order the district court to permit that filing. 91To secure that order the petitioner
has to establish that he has made a prima facie showing that the claim presented
in the second or successive petition was not previously raised and that the claim
(1) relies on a new, previously unavailable constitutional rule that was made
retroactive by the United States Supreme Court, or (2) the factual predicate of
the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of
due diligence, and the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder
would have found the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.92 Claims of
factual innocence have to satisfy the latter provision. 93 There is no appellate
review from the Sixth Circuit's denial of a motion to file a second or successive
habeas petition.9 4
b. The Constructionof Innocence in FederalHabeas
The United States Supreme Court, through federal habeas review, has
developed the federal constitutional parameters for a convicted defendant to
assert a claim of innocence. In the mid-i 980s the Court began to narrow the
availability of the federal writ of habeas corpus by imposing procedural
barriers.95 In so doing, the Court intimated
96 that an innocent individual would be
excused from these procedural barriers.
86. See RuLE 8(b) OF THE RuLEs GOVERNING § 2254 CASES INTHE U.S. DIST. CT.
87. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2009); FED. R. ApP. P. 22(b).

89. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2009).
90. See id. § 2253(c); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b).

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2009).
Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2009).
See Ross v. Berghuis, 417 F.3d 552, 556-57 n.4 (6th Cir. 2005).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (2009).

95. See generally Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of This Mess: Steps TowardAddressing
andA voiding InordinateDelay in CapitalCases, 89 J. CRIM. L&CRIMINOLOGY 1,25-27 & n.

2009]

EMBRACING A TRUTH FORUM

The issue came into sharper focus starting with Murray v. Carrier,where
the Court considered whether a habeas petitioner, who did not comply with the
state court procedural rules (known as a procedural default) was entitled to have
a federal habeas court consider the merits of the issue that was procedurally
barred.97 The Court answered in the negative, ruling that the petitioner would
have to establish both "cause and prejudice" for the failure before a federal
habeas court could consider the merits of the otherwise defaulted claim. 98
"Cause" was defined as some factor external to the defense that impeded the
defendant's ability to comply with the state procedural rule. 99 The Court
defined "prejudice" at least two different ways. When there was actual
prejudice, the petitioner needed to show that "he might not have been
convicted."' 00 If the claim was ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner
had to show that there was a "reasonable probability" that he would not have
been convicted but for counsel's unprofessional errors.10 1 The Court went on to
express its confidence that most:
"victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-andprejudice standard." But we do not pretend that this will always be true.
Accordingly, we think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the
writ even in the absence of a
10 2
showing of cause for the procedural default.
That same day the Court relied on this newly articulated "innocence
exception" to otherwise limit the availability of federal habeas. In Kuhlman v.
Wilson, the Court reviewed a successive petition in which the identical grounds
for relief were previously raised and rejected on the merits. 0 3 A plurality ofthe
Court concluded that federal courts were required to entertain successive
habeas petitions "only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim
with a colorable showing of factual innocence."' 1 4 In Sawyer v. Whitley, six
years later, the Court further defined the actual innocence exception. 105 Sawyer
articulated what a habeas petitioner needed to establish so that the reviewing
habeas court could get to the merits of his or her successive, abusive, or

111 (1998) (listing major cases).
96. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986);
Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
97. Murray, 477 U.S. at 481-82.

98. Id. at 485,492.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 488.
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)).
Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986).
Id. at 454 (plurality opinion).
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:511

defaulted claim. 106 According to the Court, the petitioner had to "show by clear
and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror
would have found [him] eligible for the death penalty.' 1 7 In the words of the
court, such a showing 0would
prove that the petitioner was "'actually innocent'
8
of the death penalty."'
In 1993, in Herrerav. Collins, the Court directly addressed how a federal
habeas court should proceed when, in a subsequent habeas petition, a capital
defendant proffers newly discovered evidence to support his claim that he did
not commit the crime for which he is convicted. 0 9 Herrera did not allege that
his conviction and sentence were secured by of a violation of his constitutional
rights. 0 Rather, he claimed that to execute an innocent person was itself a
violation of the federal constitution and that habeas corpus relief should be
available to him to prevent his execution."' The Court characterized the case as
raising a free-standing "factual innocence" or "actual innocence" claim. 12 The
Court noted that "[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent
an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state
criminal proceeding. ' 13 The Court also noted that its "habeas jurisprudence
makes clear that a claim of 'actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional
claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass
114to
have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.,,
Despite this clear basis for not proceeding further, the Court went on to
assume that a persuasive demonstration of actual innocence made after trial
would warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenues open to
handle such a claim.' 15 The Court stated that the threshold showing for such a
claim must be "extraordinarily high."' " 6 Nonetheless, five members of the
Court's majority joined opinions that carefully scrutinized
Herrera's evidence
7
before rejecting it as not meeting that threshold."
Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases have endeavored to apply the
innocence exception. Schulp v. Delo considered the standard that should apply
to an actual innocence claim in a second federal habeas petition that also asserts

106. Id. at 33.
107. Id.at 336.
108. Id.at 335.
109. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
110. Id.at 404 (distinguishing the Sawyer line of cases).
111. Id.at393.
112. Id.at401,405.
113. Id. at 400.
114. Id.at404.
115. Id.at417-19.
116. Id.at 417.
117. Id. at 417-19; id. at 421-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 429 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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constitutional trial errors. l 18 The Court ruled that the standard announced in
Carrierwas the appropriate standard to apply."9 It viewed the actual innocence
claim in Schulp as procedural,120 as Schulp offered it to bring him within the
narrow class of cases in which a procedural default is excused to avoid a
miscarriage ofjustice.'l 1His claim of innocence was a gateway through which
he had to pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on
the merits. To secure relief, the evidence proffered had to "establish sufficient
doubt about his guilt to justify the conclusion that his execution would be a
miscarriage ofjustice unless his conviction was the product of a fair trial.' ' 2 2 In
other words, the petitioner would have to show that it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have
23 found him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt in light of the new evidence.1
The Court's latest effort 24 in addressing an innocence claim in federal
habeas corpus is House v. Bell, a Tennessee capital case. 125 In House,the Court
determined that the petitioner satisfied the actual innocence showing, as
required under Schulp. 2 6 House was convicted of murdering a woman. 27
House relied on, among other things, DNA testing that occurred after his
conviction, indicating that he was not the source of the semen on the victim's
nightgown and underwear. 128 In the Court's view, the semen was critical to the
prosecution's theory of the case, as it supplied a motive for the murder and was
the only evidence at the crime scene that supposedly linked House to the
crime. 1 29 Forensic tests and testimony in the habeas proceeding also raised
questions about how the victim's blood got onto House's pants.' 3 The defense
contended that the blood was not there as a result of the crime, but had been
spilled on the pants when the pants and vials of the victim's blood were
transported together for testing.' 3 ' The Court observed: "whereas the
bloodstains, emphasized by the prosecution, seemed strong evidence of
118. Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
119. Id. at 324.
120. Id. at 314.
121. Id. at 314-15 (citing McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)).
122. Id. at 316 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 327.
124. It is unclear the extent to which the 1996 amendments to federal habeas law have
altered the actual innocence caselaw. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (ruling 1996
standard does not apply to first federal habeas petition seeking review of defaulted claim based
on actual innocence); Eli Paul Mazur, "I'm Innocent;" Addressing FreestandingClaims of
Actual Innocence in State and Federal Courts, 25 N.C. CENT. L. J. 197, 221 n.203 (2003)
(summarizing views of commentators).
125. House, 547 U.S. at 518.
126. Id. at 522.
127. Id. at 532.
128. Id.at 534, 540-48.
129. Id. at 541.
130. Id. at 541-48.
131. Id. at 542-43.
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House's guilt at trial, the record now raises substantial questions about the
blood's origin.' 32 The Court then noted that several post-trial witnesses
pointed to the victim's husband as the murderer, including two witnesses who
said he had later confessed to the crime. In light of all of the evidence presented
in the habeas proceedings the Court wrote: "although the issue is close, we
conclude that this is the rare case where - had the jury heard all of the
conflicting testimony - it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
viewing the record as whole would lack reasonable doubt."' 33 However,
the
34
Court went on to reject House's free-standing claim of innocence.'
6. Conclusion
Despite the extensive process required to convict a capital defendant and
impose a death sentence, it is extremely difficult after the trial for a capital
defendant to have a court inquire into his innocence. After being convicted, the
defendant is no longer presumed innocent. Rather, he or she stands before the
courts as a convicted aggravated murderer, whose guilt has been proven by the
highest standard in the law and upon whom the harshest penalty has been
imposed. The direct appeal is the best opportunity for a court to determine the
defendant's innocence.
Subsequent avenues for judicial review are more illusory than meaningful
because even in the initial post-conviction proceeding, the defendant faces an
array of legal procedural bars, each of which must be overcome before the court
can consider the merits of his or her claim.' 35 For discretionary appeals, the
defendant has the additional burden of having to persuade the court that the
case is sufficiently important for to grant appellate review. These hurdles are
only compounded by the fact that, with each subsequent post-conviction
petition, the defendant likely faces additional procedural bars. Thus, although a
Tennessee capital defendant can conceivably have 49 state and federal judges
review his or her legal arguments, 3 6 in actuality only the trial judge and eight
132. Id.at 548.
133. Id.at 554.
134. Id.at 554-55.
135. The writ of error coram nobis is not an appeal per se; it is a safety valve. It provides a
process by which newly uncovered, relevant evidence can be immediately brought to the trial
judge's attention, so that judge can assess whether a new trial is in order.
136. On direct appeal the case may come before eighteen judges. The defendant can move
the trial court for a judgment of acquittal; argue on direct appeal before a three-judge panel of
Court of Criminal Appeals judges, and the five Tennessee Supreme Court justices. The
defendant may then seek discretionary review before the nine justices of the United States
Supreme Court. If unsuccessful there are eighteen more judges who may be asked to review the
case on state post-conviction: the trial judge and three Court of Criminal Appeals judges. The
Tennessee Supreme Court's five justices and the nine Unites States Supreme Court justices
exercise discretionary review. Finally, the defendant can file a federal habeas petition before a
United States District Court judge, and appeal adverse rulings to a three-judge panel of the Sixth
Circuit and then seek discretionary review from the nine justices of the United States Supreme
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state appellate judges, who review the case on direct appeal, normally assess
the defendant's innocence without needing to overcome serious procedural

bars. 137
B. Recent Developments
1. ABA's Death Penalty Moratorium's Report and Recommendation
In light of this reality, in March 2007, the ABA Death Penalty Moratorium
Implementation Project's Tennessee Death Penalty Assessment Report made
the following observation:
The State of Tennessee does not properly ensure that claims of factual
innocence receive adequate judicial review. While the State of Tennessee has
mechanisms to handle claims of factual innocence, including normal postconviction proceedings and writs of error coram nobis, neither of these
mechanisms is working as intended. For example, Tennessee courts have
failed to provide relief to one death row inmate, Paul House, despite the fact
that the United States Supreme Court concluded that "it is more likely than
not that no reasonable
juror would have found [House] guilty beyond a
38
reasonable doubt."'
The Report consequently recommended:
The State of Tennessee should create an independent commission, with the
power to conduct investigations, hold hearings, and test evidence, to review
claims of factual innocence in capital cases. If the commission sustains the
inmate's claim of factual innocence, it would either (a) forward to the
Governor a recommendation for pardon or (b) submit the case to a panel of
judges, who would review the claim without regard to any procedural bars.
This sort of commission, which would supplement either the current postconviction or clemency process, is necessary, in large part because procedural
defaults and inadequate lawyers sometimes prevent
39 claims of factual
innocence from receiving full judicial consideration.'

Court. Though 49 judges are asked to grant the defendant relief, some of the judges have to
review the case more than once: the case may appear before the same trial judge at least three
times and before the same justices on the Tennessee and United States Supreme Courts. In
addition, it is likely that some of the same Court of Criminal Appeals judges will review the case
more than once. This summary excludes new trial motions, writs of corum nobis, and motions
for rehearings or reconsideration and other procedural or emergency motions.
137. See page 515-16, supra.
138.

ABA DEATH PENALTY MORATORIuM IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, supranote 5, at iii-iv

(citing House, 574 U.S. at 554).
139. Id.at vi.
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2. Two Recent Capital Cases as Examples
The defect in the processing of Tennessee capital cases is especially
apparent when the direct appeals process has been completed and the inmate
alleges that the execution should not go forward because there is evidence of
his or her innocence. This scenario occurred in both Philip Workman's 140 and
Paul House's141 cases.
In 1982, Workman was sentenced to death for shooting a police officer,
who responded to a call concerning a robbery in progress at a restaurant that
Workman was in the process of robbing. 42 At trial, Workman did not dispute
that he committed the robbery, but claimed he remembered only "bits and
pieces" of the incident. 143 His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal.144 Two state post-conviction petitions and his federal habeas petitions
were rejected. 45 While preparing for clemency proceedings in 2000,
Workman's attorneys unearthed an X-ray of the victim's body in the State's
possession, which suggested that the fatal bullet didn't come from Workman's
gun, thus making him ineligible for the death penalty.146 Despite this evidence,
and after being granted a coram nobis proceeding to assess whether a new trial
should be granted based on that and other evidence, the courts held that the
evidence would not have resulted in a different verdict. 147 Workman was
executed on May 9, 2007.148
House was sentenced to death in 1986.49 Yet in 2006, the United States
Supreme Court concluded in his federal habeas proceeding that, in light of the
evidence he later uncovered, there was a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 50 In
May 2009, the county district attorney moved to dismiss the charges against
House.' This motion came three months after subsequent tests revealed that
the semen from the victim's clothing did not belong to House or the victim's

140. Workman v. State, 111 S.W.3d 10 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
141. House, 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
142. See State v. Workman, 667 S.W.2d 44,46-47 (Tenn. 1984).
143. Id. at 47.
144. Id. at. 52.
145. See Philip Ray Workman v. State, C.C.A. No. 111, 1987 WL 6724 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Feb. 18, 1987); Workman v. State, 868 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); Workman v. Bell,
178 F.3d 759 (6th Cir. 1998).
146. See Workman v. Bell, 41 S.W.3d 110, 103 (Tenn. 2001); Kirk Loggins, HeistDooms
Workman, Say Legal Experts, TENNESsEAN, Mar. 14, 2000, at Al.
147. See State v. Workman, 111 S.W.3d 10, 18-21 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (affirming
trial judge's denial of motion for a writ of coram nobis).
148. Sheila Burke, Brad Schrade, & Sheila Wissner, Workman Executed, TENNESSEAN,
May 9, 2007, at Al.
149. See State v. House, 911 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tenn. 1995).
150. 547 U.S. 518
151. Jamie Satterfield, Finally, a LegalReprieve: PaulHouse Gets Second Chance Thanks
to Investigators,Forensics, KNoxvuLLE NEWS-SDINEL, May 17, 2009, at B 1.
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husband. 5 2 The county district attorney explained his decision: "[o]bviously,
we have very strongly held opinions that Mr. House was involved. What
convinced us that as a matter of law there was reasonable doubt [of House's
guilt in the slaying of Carolyn Muncey] is the possibility of others being
involved and not being able to show the degree of House's culpability.' ' 53 In
contrast, House's attorney stated: "I know without question he didn't kill
her."'154 Notwithstanding these developments, there has not been a legal
declaration that House is factually innocent.
IH.LINGERING QUESTION OF INNOCENCE IN THE USA

Every criminal litigation system has the possibility of convicting the
factually innocent. In 1923, Judge Learned Hand famously dismissed concerns
about convicting the innocent as fictional. 55 He asserted
56 that constitutional and
procedural guarantees prevented it from occurring.'
The fear of executing innocents has long been an objection against the
death penalty. In 1775, English theorist Jeremy Bentham noted that there was
no remedy for the execution of the innocent.'5 7 In 1871, the Marquis de
Lafayette echoed a similar sentiment.' 58 Indeed, at least since the nineteenth
century, death penalty abolitionists in this country have made the same point in
arguing for the end of capital punishment.' 59 Abolitionists argue that when the
punishment is death and a mistake is later uncovered, it is irreversible because
the executed, 160
unlike an inmate serving a term of years, cannot be relieved from
the sentence.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Judge Learned Hand wrote "Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the
accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It
is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that
obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime." United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646,
649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Learned Hand, J.); see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,398-99,401-02
(1993); id. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our society has a high degree of confidence in
its criminal trials, in no small part because the Constitution offers unparalleled protections
against convicting the innocent.")
156. Garsson, 291 F. at 649.
157. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 186-89 (1775).
158. See CHARLES LUCAS, RECUEIL DES DEBATS DES ASSEMBLEES LEGISLATIVES DE LA
FRANCE SuR LA QUESTION DE LA PEiNE DE MORT, pt. 2, 42 (1831).
159. See Bruce P. Smith, The History of Wrongful Execution, 56 HASTINGS L.J. i185,
1189-1214 (2005) (describing executions of innocent persons from England in 1640 to 1790
and in the United States from 1790 to 1900); see also ANDREW J. PALM, THE DEATH PENALTY: A
CONSIDERATION OF THE OBJECTIONS TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, WITH A CHAPTER ON WAR (1891);
(EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932)
(reviewing sixty-five criminal cases of wrongful conviction from the early 20th century).
160. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEvrrABILITY OF CAPRICE AND
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Since the 1990s there has been growing body of empirical of evidence on
wrongful criminal convictions.161 This evidence has been occasioned by the
exoneration of inmates through the testing of DNA. Yet, even before DNA was
being widely used to exonerate defendants, Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael L.
Radelet studied potentially capital cases in which they suspected were
miscarriages ofjustice.162 In 1987, Bedau and Radelet noted that "[t]here is no
common or typical route by which an innocent defendant can be vindicated,
and vindication if it ever comes, will not necessarily come in time to benefit the
defendant.' ' 163 Professors Bedau and Radelet observed how the errors were
uncovered: sometimes the actual perpetrator of the crime confessed; an
eyewitness recanted or revised their testimony; the trial judge pursued an
investigation; someone with the police, law enforcement, or the prosecutor's
office uncovered exculpatory evidence; but most of the time it was the "dogged
efforts of defense counsel," who continued to pursue exoneration long after the
trial's conclusion."' 164
Later research on exonerations has affirmed these observations. A study of
a fifteen-year period of all prosecutions in the United States concluded that 340
65
persons had been wrongfully convicted and were subsequently exonerated.
Most of the exonerated had been convicted of murder or rape.166 Eyewitness
misidentification, especially cross-racial misidentification, was a leading cause
of false conviction in rape cases, and perjury was a key factor in the wrongful
conviction of defendants for murder.' 67 Capital cases were, in the authors'
words, "over represented" in the study partly because of efforts made not to
execute an innocent person. 168 The study implied that capital cases were
underrepresented as well.' 69 After noting that most successful capital
convictions eventually result in a sentence other than the death penalty, the
authors observed:
the bulk of defendants at capital trials are subject to the frightening risk of
error that plagues capital prosecutions - they are as likely as other defendants
to be convicted of murders they did not commit - but they get little or none of
the special care that is devoted to re-examining death sentences after
conviction. In all likelihood, the great majority of innocent defendants who

MISTAKE (1974).

161.

See Samuel R. Gross, et al., Exonerationsin the UnitedStates 1989 through 2003, 95

J. CRAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005).

162. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially
CapitalCases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 70 (1987).
163. Id.at 70.
164. Id.at67.
165. Gross et al., supra note 161, at 524.
166. Id.at 528-29.
167. Id. at 542-44.
168. Id.at 552.
169. Id.

2009]

EMBRACING A TRUTH FORUM

are convicted of capital murder are neither executed
nor exonerated but
70
sentenced to prison for life, and then forgotten."'
In another study, Brandon Garrett limited his review to those exonerated by
post-conviction DNA evidence.' 7' He noted that "[w]rongful convictions
generally occur despite weak inculpatory evidence and because credible
exculpatory evidence is excluded or not uncovered.' 72 This reality is only
compounded by the fact that evidence that exonerates tends to come to light
years later. 73 These reports on exonerated capital defendants were so effective
that they led Justice Souter to write in Kansas v. Marsh that, "[t]oday, a new
body of fact must be accounted for what, in practical terms, the Eighth
Amendment guarantees should tolerate, for the period starting in 1989 has seen
repeated exonerations of convictions under death sentences, in numbers never
imagined before the development of DNA tests.' ', 74 He later observed: "We are
75
thus in a period of new empirical argument about how 'death is different."
Even before Justice Souter's dissent in Marsh, some commentators were
predicting that verifiable claims of innocence were changing this nation's
criminal litigation processes. Two of the most prominent and optimistic articles
appeared in 2004 and declared that this nation was in the midst of an
"innocence revolution."' 176 Lawrence C. Marshall posited that DNA testing and
hundreds of post-conviction exonerations - including twelve death row inmates
- raised questions about the reliability of the criminal justice system and should
prompt reconsideration of its premises. 77 For Marshall, the path to abolition
was clear: "I have no doubt that if the public can be convinced, on the facts,
that innocent people are being sentenced to death with some frequency, the
death penalty will be abolished in the United States."'' 78 Death penalty
abolitionists could now focus on the practical issues of fairness and accuracy of
capital punishment. 179 Innocence claims connected more viscerally with the
public than the value judgments often found in Warren Court opinions.180 In
Marshall's view, the focus on innocence and evidence of wrongful convictions

170. Id. at 552-53.
171. SeeBrandon L. Garrett,JudgingInnocence, 108 COLJM. L. REv. 55, 73-121 (2008).
172. Id.
173. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 162, at 64-72; Garrett, supranote 171, at 119; Grosset
al., supra note 161, at 523.
174. Kansas, 548 U.S. at 207-08 (Souter, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at210.
176. See Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OH.
ST. J. CRiM. L. 573, 573 (2004); Mark A. Godsey& Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution
and Our "Evolving Standards ofDecency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence,29 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 265, 265 (2004).
177. Marshall, supranote 176, at 575.
178. Id at 577.
179. Id. at 576.

180. Id. at 577.
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required death penalty supporters to establish why the death penalty should be
retained. '
Similar sentiments were expressed by Mark A. Godsey and Thomas
Pulley. 182 According to these scholars, successful innocence claims
demonstrated that innocents were convicted and thus were eroding public
support for the death penalty. 183 The authors noted that the conviction of
innocents should also inform capital punishment jurisprudence in assessing
whether the death penalty comported with evolving standards of decency.
Short of calling for the abolition of the death penalty, Godsey and Pulley
proposed possible reforms to the criminal litigation process that might help
decrease the number of innocents convicted of crimes. 8 5 They concluded by
noting that "in imposing the ultimate irreversible punishment, we need to
carefully evaluate our willingness to possibly end an innocent person's life.
This evaluation needs to be informed by the risks, viable
8 6 alternative, and the
extent that further safeguards could assist if utilized."'
Other commentators have been more circumspect in relying on innocence
claims in assessing the utility of the death penalty. For instance, Margaret
Raymond perceived various ways that success wrought by the innocence
movement could be turned on its head. 8 7 She argued:
the focus on factual innocence may create certain distortions in the way that
actors in the criminal justice system - the "ones left behind - perceive their
obligations and allegiances. It may convince the public, including
policymakers, that the system works effectively to reveal and redress
wrongful convictions. It may convince prospective juror that it is -or should
be-the defendant's burden to prove innocence. It may convince potential
criminal defense clients that only the innocent secure the loyal and skilled
assistance of a committed attorney. 188
In her view, innocence claims were one of several strategies that should be
pursued to challenge wrongful convictions.18 9 Systematic reforms - beyond
securing access to DNA evidence and testing - should be pursued. 190
Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker more directly questioned some of
Marshall's assertions.' 9' They contended that innocence claims were not
181. Id. at 581.
182. Godsey & Pulley, supra note 176, at 265.
183. Id. at 265-66, 284.
184. Id. at 267.
185. Id. at 290-92.
186. Id. at 292.
187. Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence,49 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 449 (2001).
188. Id. at461.
189. Id. at461.
190. Id. at 461-63.
191. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seductionoflnnocence: TheAttraction and
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in CapitalPunishmentLaw andAdvocacy, 95 J. CIuM. L.

2009]

EMBRACING A TRUTH FORUM

sufficiently unique from other systemic challenges to the death penalty. 92
Though the innocence claim was attractive to Marshall because of its intuitive
appeal to everyone, 93 Steiker and Steiker focused more on the fact that "most
Americans can empathize with the harms that they fear could happen to
themselves, rather than those that can happen only to 'bad people"' could
eventually result in public "indifference it not hostility to other types of
injustice."' 194 In their view, other defects in the administration of capital
punishment - its arbitrary and discriminatory administration and the execution
of guilty but undeserving or impaired defendants - occurred more frequently
and deserved
a higher priority in the critique of the capital punishment
95
system. 1
Steiker and Steiker also questioned the strategy of focusing on innocence as
a means of reforming or abolishing capital punishment because focusing on
innocence actually dovetailed with efforts made by groups hostile to the
interests of criminal defendants. 196 Since the 1970s the United States Supreme
Court had effectively limited the constitutional criminal procedure rights of
criminal defendants. 97 Rather than directly curtailing those rights and the writ
of habeas corpus, the Court often asserted that relief would not be available if
the outcome in the case was accurate or reliable, notwithstanding the purported
violation of the federal constitution. 98 In so doing, the Court ignored the value
of having procedural rights in the first instance. Similarly, death penalty
abolitionists who rely primarily on innocence claims to reform the death penalty
are denigrating the value of requiring the state to prove its case while respecting
the rights of the criminally accused. In so doing, these advocates might forego
opportunities to launch other systemic critiques against the death penalty in
cases where there is not a colorable claim of innocence. 99 In short, Steiker and
Steiker's critique underscored the connection between a process focused on
obtaining the truth and a legal claim resting on the truth: in both instances the
process and other values may be compromised in the search for the truth.
Steiker and Steiker concluded by warning that abolitionism
founded on
200
innocence revolution might not be either wise or effective.

& CiMINoLOGY 587 (2005).
192. Id.at 596-607.
193. Marshall, supra note 176, at 577.
194. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 191, at 597.
195. Id. at 606.
196. Id.at 607-23.
197. Id.at 609-15.
198. Id.at 612.
199. Jeffery L. Kirchmeier makes a similar point while explaining the problems with and
perhaps irrelevance of finding an innocent person who has been executed in the modem era.
Jeffery L. Kirchmeier, Dead Innocent: The Death PenaltyAbolitionistSearchfor a Wrongful
Execution, 42 TULSA L. REv. 403, 427-28 (2006).
200. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 191, at 624.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:511

Others commentators have used the attention generated by the innocence
movement to map out future directions for capital punishment research and
scholarship. Daniel S. Mewed, for example, has suggested that reformist
scholarship falls into three categories: (1) structural or systemic changes to the
criminal litigation process, (2) changes in processing specific types of cases,
20 1
and (3) incorporating outside approaches and systems into the process.
Andrew M. Siegel suggested that the next wave of scholarship promoted by the
innocence movement should identify and focus on reforming systematic design
failures in the criminal litigation process. 20 2 He mentioned as examples "the
irrationalities and biases built into our system of docket management, plea
bargaining, or jury instructions'20 3 and the quality of defense counsel. 2 4
Making these changes, Siegel noted, will improve the quality ofjustice meted
out in all cases. 20 5 He acknowledged that an innocence-based challenge to some
of these systemic components has been successful and encouraged careful
selection of the next issues to continue with that momentum.20 6 Siegel thus
suggested that "many systemic design flaws are readily amendable to a
nonpartisan, innocence-centered, common sense appeal." In his view, the
innocence movement can take the next step by extending its concerns beyond
the realm of DNA testing:
A properly waged litigation and advocacy campaign focusing on systemic
design failures can maintain a strategic focus on publicizing individual cases
where factually innocent defendants were convicted or pled guilty, the
innocent movement's calling card, while simultaneously refuting the actuarial
arguments of the innocence movement's critics through a demonstration of
the scale of the consequences of a given systematic design flaw.20 8
In sum, the conviction of the innocent, a matter of concern for centuries,
has emerged from the shadows, largely due to DNA testing. Though initially
heralded as the lynchpin to the abolition or reform of the death penalty,
evidence of convictions of innocent defendants has neither made the death
penalty obsolete nor brought about wholesale changes. Notwithstanding this
outcome, the innocence movement has brought about some constructive

201. Daniel S. Medwed, Looking Foreword: Wrongful Convictions andSystemic Reform,
42 AM. CriM. L. REv. 1117, 1118 (2005).
202. Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposalfor a Third
Generation of Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 Am. CluIM. L. REV. 1219
(2005).
203. Id.at 1223.
204. Id. at 1228.
205. Id. at 1223.
206. Id. at 1225-29.
207. Id. at 1229.
208. Id at 1230.
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developments in the criminal litigation -process and has prompted further
reflections on the accuracy of the system.
m. IDENTIFYING CONVICTED INNOCENTS

One import of the innocence movement is that wrongful convictions can be
identified if time and resources are devoted to investigating and assessing
potentially exculpatory information. Professors Bedau and Radelet made a
similar observation in 1987.210 They also described the work of one group:
In twelve cases, the efforts of a small group of persons dedicated to
investigating and exposing erroneous felony convictions--"The Court of Last
Resort"--discovered the exculpatory evidence. This group seems to have been
the only one, public or private, ever established with the sole purpose of
investigating possible judicial error and, in those cases where the newly
discovered evidence seemed overwhelmingly in favor of the convicted
21
defendant, of trying to convince the authorities to act on that evidence. '

Indeed, DNA-based exonerations, which have received the majority of
attention, have been the work of a dedicated few.212 The work of other wrongful
209. The scholarly conversations on innocence, wrongful convictions, and the criminal
litigation process continue. See Tim Bakken, Truth andInnocence Proceduresto FreeInnocent
Persons: Beyond the AdversarialSystem, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 547 (2008) (proposing
changes to criminal litigation process to ensure that the search for truth is paramount); Keith A.
Findley, Toward a New Paradigmof CriminalJustice:How the Innocence Movement Merges
Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEx. TECH L. Rv. 133 (2008) (maintaining that the
innocence movement has ushered in a Reliability Model of best practices of criminal justice,
supplementing the Crime Control and Due Process Models); Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence
Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological Evidence Under Innocence
Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239 (2005) (critiquing the failure of states to
preserve biological evidence, which might be used to free the wrongfully convicted); Daniel S.
Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1549 (maintaining that the focus on innocence is a
positive development that could supplement substantive and procedural changes in the law);
Michael L. Radelet, The Role of the Innocence Argument in Contemporary Death Penalty
Debates, 41 TEX. TECH L. REv. 199 (2008) (claiming that the innocence inquiry has brought
about the decline in the support of the death penalty and allowed for reconsideration of racial
bias and arbitrariness, which highlight that the death penalty is not reserved for the worst of the
worst); D. Michael Risigner, Unsafe Verdicts: The Needfor Reformed Standardsfor the Trial
andReview ofFactualInnocence Claims, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1281 (2004) (proposing trial level
reforms to adjudicate factual innocence claims); Daina Borteck, Note, Pleasfor DNA Testing:
Why Lawmakers Should Amend State Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to
Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 CARDOzo L. REv. 1429 (2004) (proposing use of DNA testing in
cases resolved by a guilty plea as a means of addressing wrongful convictions).
210. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 162, at 64-70.
211. Id. at69.
212. This statement is relative. Of the hundreds of thousands of lawyers in the United
States, only a very small percentage are involved in challenging wrongful convictions. For a link
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conviction scholars and advocates indicates that there are generally agreed upon
factors that lead to wrongful convictions: mistaken eyewitness identification,
poor quality forensic science, coerced confessions, police or prosecutorial
misconduct, perjured testimony, and inadequate or overmatched defense
counsel.213
A. Mello's Truth Jury Proposal

Apparently aware of these developments, Michael Mello has proposed
melding the investigative work on behalf of the defense with the expertise of
professionals.21 4 After extensively documenting his frustrations in representing
a capital defendant whom he was convinced was innocent, Mello suggested the
creation of a new forum in capital cases. 21 5 According to Mello:
Lawyers and judges are in pursuit of legal truth, truth by legal means.
Lawyers and judges focus on legalisms, often on legalisms of a procedural
and technical sort....
As often as not, the law's preoccupation with procedural matters works
against criminal defendants--to preclude appellate courts from even
consideringnewly discovered evidence that the state got the wrong person,
that a death row prisoner is, in fact, totally innocent of the crime....
I propose the creation of a truth super-jury to investigate and decide death
row prisoners' claims of factual innocence. Note that I do not say a truth
court. Judges and lawyers would be excluded from the body I propose. The
last thing we need is yet another court peopled and run by linear thinkers who
obsess with procedure over substance and who "think like lawyers."... The
truth jury would have a roving mandate to evaluate and investigate claims of
factual innocence, and the jury would possess the expertise to make its
judgments reliable and worthy of trust and respect. The jury would consist of
experienced forensic investigators, experts (on ballistics, fingerprinting,
DNA, and the like), forensic criminologists, polygraphers, and so on. The
jury would not be hand-cuffed by the legalistic technicalities that preclude
courts from considering newly-discovered evidence of innocence. Since the
prisoner would have the option of going to the truth jury (or not), the jury
would compel the prisoner to answer its questions (about alibi, for instance),
to a network of such organizations and individuals see http://www.innocenceproject.org (last
visited May 29, 2009)
213. See e.g., Garrett,supra note 171, at 122; Gross, supranote 161, at 551; Robert Carl
Schehr, The CriminalCases Review Commission as a State StrategicSelection Mechanism,42
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1289, 1289 (1995); Donald J. Sorochan, Wrongful Convictions:Preventing
MiscarriagesofJustice Some Case Studies, 41 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 93, 97 (2008) (Canadian
study).
214. Michael Mello, Death and His Lawyers: Why Joseph Spaziano Owes His Life to the
Miami Herald--and Not to Any Defense Lawyer or Judge, 20 VT. L. REv. 19 (1995).
215. Id. at 19-49.
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and the jury could rightly demand that defense counsel open up her files to
the jury.
The truth jury would exist to answer one question and one question alone:
"Did he commit the crime?" Not: "Did he do it, but was he crazy?"; not "Did
he do it, but did he have a bad childhood?"; not "Did he do it, but does he
deserve to die for it?" . . . the truth jury would only ask whether the

condemned prisoner is factually innocent.
We need a truth super-jury for the [innocent] on our death rows. More
importantly, we need a truth super-jury for ourselves,
to ensure that an
2 16
innocent person is not put to death in our names.

B. A Truth Forum in Tennessee
We should embrace the truth jury concept in Tennessee. Such an action
was the thrust of the ABA Report's recommendation quoted above.217 There are
currently no sufficient avenues for a capital defendant to raise a factual
innocence claim late in the criminal litigation process - especially when the
basis for the factual innocence claim is not based on DNA-related evidence. As
more fully detailed above in Part I, new trial motions, petitions for writs of
coram nobis, direct appeals, and post-conviction proceedings in both state and
federal courts are generally an insufficient avenue through which to raise and
litigate the defendant's innocence.
While Professor Mello utilizes the term truth super-jury,21 8 this Article
introduces a broader concept: the truth forum. As will be discussed in Part IV,a
key issue is where structurally a truth forum would best be created and housed
in Tennessee government. While the term truth super-jury makes sense for
operation in the judicial branch, the broader term truth forum opens up the
possibility of operation in the executive or legislative branches as well.
It is worth noting what would not be a part of the truth forum's inquiry.
The truth forum would not be for questions of "fairness" per se, that is, how the
death penalty is being applied;2 '9 nor would it inquire into whether the defense
attorney was competent or rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. 220 The
truth forum would not answer whether there was impermissible racial bias in
the prosecution of the defendant, 221 nor would it be able to inquire if there was
prosecutorial misconduct in securing the conviction.222 It is not that the answers
216. Id.at 53-54.
217.
218.

ABA DEATH PENALTY MORAToRIuM
Mello, supra note 214, at 53.

IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, supra note 5.

219. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37
(1984).
220. See e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
221. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279; Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
222. See, e.g., Kyles. v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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to any of these questions are unimportant; capital punishment litigation tells us
just the opposite. Indeed, a positive answer to any of these inquiries coupled
with a sufficient showing
of actual innocence would state a cognizable claim on
223
federal habeas review.

Death penalty abolitionists might disagree, claiming that my proposal
imposes too many limits on the scope of the truth forum. But keep in mind both
the purpose of the truth forum and its power. The purpose is to determine
whether the capitally condemned inmate committed the crime, i.e., whether the
defendant is innocent. Its power lies in its ability to answer "No" to that
question. If the inmate did not commit the crime, then the truth forum should
issue a binding judgment that prevents the execution of the defendant. In other
words, the truth forum will provide a hearing on an otherwise overlooked or
procedurally barred claim of factual innocence.
If we accept Professor Mello's concern that "[t]he last thing we need is yet
another court peopled and run by linear thinkers who obsess with procedure
over substance and who 'think like lawyers'," then we have to be careful to
make sure that we are not just creating another post-conviction process that is
subject to delay, manipulation, abuse, and obfuscation.
C. Availability and Composition of the Truth Forum
This outcome can be accomplished by limiting the availability to the truth
forum. First, the truth forum should only be available at the very end of the
capital litigation process - ideally only when no other judicial forum, either at
the state or federal level, is available. Therefore, the time to go to the truth
hearing would be within two weeks of the scheduled serious execution date.
The truth hearing should not have the power to delay an execution. If the
Governor wanted to delay the execution to hear from the forum or to allow the
forum more time to do its work, that delay would be satisfactory. In order to be
most effective, the truth forum participants should have expertise in at least one
of several areas: forensic investigation, forensic criminology, polygraph
analysis, ethics of the legal profession, ethics of police work, and other areas as
needed, based on the evidence that will be presented in the truth forum.224
Second, no appeal should lie from the truth forum's verdict. Providing an
appeal will not only likely delay the pending execution, but the appellate
process is ill-suited for resolving the essentially factual question before the truth
forum, composed of specially selected experts. Indeed, appellate challenges to
the truth forum's verdict would necessarily be difficult, if the traditional
standards of appellate review applied. The appellant would have to establish
223.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2009); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993).

224. In this regard, Professor Mello's proposal harkens back to the past and the special jury
or jury of experts discussed by Learned Hand and James Oldham. See Learned Hand, Historical
and Practical ConsiderationsRegarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40, 56-58
(1901); James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 137, 164-76
(1983). Like Hand, I embrace the possible benefits from such a practice.
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both that the findings of facts were clearly erroneous and that the truth forum
members erred assessing the evidence.
Some may fear that the lack of
appellate review may result in mischief. The concern is that the truth forum
experts might be emboldened either to ignore their oath or to render a decision
that lacks the rudiments of rationality, resulting in the possible execution of an
innocent since there is no appellate review to their verdict. However, to
alleviate this concern, if a patently insupportable verdict was issued, the
Governor via clemency may do, through the exercise of mercy, what the truth
forum failed to accomplish.
Third, an inmate should be able to visit the truth forum once: therefore, the
inmate's supporters and advisors, including lawyers, should submit to the truth
forum everything that they have uncovered in support of the prisoner's
innocence. Imposing these burdens on a capital defendant who seeks, at the last
moment, to prohibit his execution by securing a binding judgment against the
State seems to be a reasonable accommodation in light of the truth forum's
function of allowing the defendant to have a venue in which to assert his
innocence.
D. Essential Components of the Truth Forum
As of today, most convictions of the factually innocent have been involved
at least one of the following variables - mistaken eyewitness identification,
poor quality forensic science, coerced confessions, police or prosecutorial
misconduct, perjured testimony, or inadequate or overmatched defense counsel;
therefore truth forum members should be qualified experts who are to assess
the prisoner's innocence claim in light of their expertise.226
The truth forum is for presentation and assessment of the capital
defendant's factual innocence claim. That claim should be resolved in a
proceeding that is able to answer that question objectively. The essence of such
225. While there is considerable caselaw on the admissibility of an expert witnesses'
testimony, considerably fewer cases address an appellate court's ability to assess the trier's
reliance on that testimony. The courts appear to defer to the trier's assessment of the testimony.
The general rule is:
if the members of the jury are satisfied of the trustworthiness of the opinion rendered by an
expert on an ultimate fact or issue, the evidence may be conclusive of the issue, but they
are not bound to accept the opinion or to render the verdict according to it. Every expert
opinion rests on an assumption of fact; if the opinion is given in response to a hypothetical
question, its weight depends wholly on the jury finding that the assumed facts have been
proved; if it is based on the expert's own testimony as to the facts, the truth of this
testimony is no less open to their belief or disbelief. In addition, the soundness of the
opinion itself must be determined by the jury in consideration of its apparent
reasonableness or their confidence in the skill and trustworthiness of the witness, and of
any contradiction from other experts.
31A AM. JUR. 2D - Expert and Opinion Evidence § 35, at 61-62 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
226. See e.g., Garrett,supra note 171, at 122; Gross, supranote 161, at 551; Schehrsupra
note 213, at 1289; Sorochan, supra note 213, at 97.
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a proceeding will be fairness. In this regard, it is instructive to consider Judge
Henry Friendly's list of the constitutionally required elements of a fair
hearing.227 Based on his assessment of Supreme Court decisions, Friendly
believed that the following features were necessary to make a hearing
constitutionally sufficient: an unbiased tribunal; notice of the proposed action
and the grounds asserted for it; an opportunity to present reasons why the
proposed actions should not be taken; the rights to call witnesses, to know the
evidence against one, and to have the decision based only on the evidence
presented; counsel; the making of a record and a statement of reasons; public
attendance; and judicial review. 28 These components suggest that the more the
proceedings resemble a court or administrative hearing the more likely they will
comport with federal constitutional requirements of fairness. In other words, the
truth forum proceeding should be governed by predetermined forensic and
procedural rules that allow evidence to be presented and arguments to be made,
ultimately resulting in a rendered decision. The components most pertinent to
the truth forum are discussed below.
UnbiasedTribunal.For the tribunal to be unbiased, the truth forum experts
and the person who presides over the proceeding must be impartial. Toward
that end, a person other than the original trial judge should preside over the
proceeding. This person might be appointed by a central authority or by mutual
agreement of the State and the defense. The person presiding as well as the
forum experts must have unbiased views on the death penalty. Thus, similar to
the original capital trial, forum experts should be screened for "death
qualification." Potential experts who are unilaterally opposed to229 or who
would unilaterally impose 230 the death penalty cannot serve. Perhaps a voir dire
less rigorous than that the type conducted in the original trial would be
sufficient because, unlike jurors who serve in the original capital trial, truth
forum experts are serving largely because of their professional qualifications
and expertise. In light of this difference, the State and the defense should be
able and willing to rely on the participants' adherence to their professional
training and ethical obligations to mitigate impartiality concerns. 3
227. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
228. Id. at 1279-95.
229. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (unconstitutional to exclude prospective
capital jurors when they express general objections to the death penalty or expressed
conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction); see also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38
(1980) (to exclude prospective capital jurors for cause they must be "so irrevocable opposed to
capital punishment as to frustrate the State's legitimate efforts to administer its constitutionally
valid death penalty").
230. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (capital defendant can remove for cause any
prospective juror who declares he or she will automatically vote to impose a death sentence
upon a finding of guilt).
231. Some judges and prosecutors who personally oppose the death penalty nonetheless
preside over and prosecute capital cases, largely without incident. See Kenneth Williams,
ShouldJudges Who Oppose CapitalPunishmentResign? A Reply to JusticeScalia, 10 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 317, 339-40 (2003) (discussing appellate judges either opposed to or with
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Nonetheless, a procedure might be adopted that allows the State and the
defense each to recommend three unbiased experts for each type of evidence at
issue (ballistics, DNA, eyewitness, polygraph). The court would select from
those lists the persons who would serve in the forum, or for good cause shown,
the court could select as an expert a person outside the list.
Notice of the Action and Reasons for It. It should not take much effort to
satisfy this component. First, both the State and the prisoner know of the
scheduled serious execution date, and the courts should have explained why the
prisoner's efforts to have the conviction or sentence reversed were
unsuccessful. Second, upon request for the convening of the truth forum,
formal notice should be sent to the State so it can participate in the proceedings.
Further, to invoke the truth forum process, the prisoner should be required to
plead a claim of factual innocence. That plea should be sufficient to put the
State on notice of the parameters of the prisoner's claim and the evidence relied
on to support it.
Opportunity to Present Reasons. For the notice component and the
proceedings themselves to have meaning, the prisoner and the State must have
an opportunity to present reasons - that is, evidence or argument - for the truth
forum to issue a verdict in its favor on the innocence claim.
Callingof Witnesses, Knowing the Evidence PresentedAgainstthe Party,
and Having the Decision Based on That Evidence. Concomitant with the
opportunity to present reasons in support of a verdict in its favor are the ability
to call witnesses, knowing the evidence presented against the party, and having
the verdict based on that evidence. Both written and testimonial evidence
should be permitted. Witnesses should be subject to cross-examination and
questions from the truth forum experts. As in other proceedings, the presiding
officer should be able to limit redundant or irrelevant evidence.
Due to the conflicting positions of the prisoner and the State, the truth
forum proceeding will likely take on an adversarial tenor. That tenor, however,
is not always an unwelcome development. Properly structured, an adversarial
proceeding - with equally matched, prepared, and ethical advocates on both
sides marshalling evidence and argument in the most persuasive fashion - can
help the forum in its search for the truth. Therefore, the State and the prisoner
should have pre-proceeding access to the evidence that will be presented by the
other side, which will allow both sides to prepare well for the proceeding and to
rebut as effectively as possible the contentions of the other side. Finally, to
ensure that the proceeding is not a meaningless ritual, the truth forum's verdict
has to be based on the evidence presented to it within the proceedings. The
question before the forum will be: "Did the defendant commit the capital
crime?" The forum's verdict must be either "Yes" or "No." As discussed
reservations about the death penalty who decided capital appeals). Justice Stevens is a worthy
example. In 2008, he concluded that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment, but
stated that he was willing to "respect precedents [upholding the constitutionality of the death
penalty] that remain a part of the law." Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1541, 1551-52 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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below, the forum experts, either collectively or as individuals, must explain
their verdict.
Counsel In light of the seriousness of the matters at stake, the finality of
the truth forum's verdict, and the need to limit error,232 having counsel present
for the truth forum is a necessity. Further, the complexity of the procedural and
substantive issues, including those necessitating expert testimony also call for
the "guiding hand of counsel" to navigate the truth forum proceeding.233 As the
United States Supreme Court noted, "[w]ithout [this guiding hand], though he
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence." 23 Indeed, more recently the Court has ruled that
attorneys appointed and paid by the federal government to represent capital
defendants in federal habeas proceedings can continue to represent that
defendant in subsequent state clemency proceedings and receive federal
compensation.2 35 The Court noted that the work done by counsel in the earlier
proceedings could be useful in the subsequent venues and that death row
inmates should not have to navigate clemency proceedings alone, which the
Court has characterized as the "fail safe" of the criminal litigation process.236
Similarly, the relationship established between counsel and client and the
nuances necessary to litigate an actual innocence claim before the truth forum
indicate that prisoners need to be represented by qualified counsel.
Making a Record and a Statement ofReasons. Typically, the parties make
a record and rely on a statement of reasons to assist in appellate review. A
comprehensive record should be compiled, and the truth forum should provide
an explanation for its verdict, even though no appeal can lie from the verdict.
My reasoning is as follows. First, the record and the forum's explanation will
both serve as historical testaments as to whether the defendant was factually
innocent. Second, requiring the truth forum experts to explain their verdict
underscores the seriousness and uniqueness of their duties. Having experts
compose a written explanation of their decision should ensure that each expert
separately considers the evidence presented and assesses its worth. 237 Third, a
written explanation that integrates the experts' expertise with the facts should
serve as a useful guide at least to the State and its law enforcement personnel,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys in subsequent capital prosecutions. The
232. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (outlining federal due process
considerations for the termination federally provided disability benefits).
233. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
234. Id.
235. Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481 (2009).
236. Id.at 1491.
237. See Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialOpinions as Binding Law and as Explanationsfor
Judgments, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 43 (1993) (exploring the value and impact of written judicial
decisions on executive branch officers); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV.
633 (1995) (exploring legal significance of giving explanations for actions or decisions).
The most analogous current practice may be the use of special verdicts or answers to
interrogatories with a special verdict in civil cases. See FED. R. Crv. P. 49; TEm. R. Civ. P. 49.
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written explanation should also further public understanding about claims of
factual innocence. In addition, the written explanations should help further
238
inform the public about how the capital punishment system actually operates.
PublicAttendance. It is difficult to understand the need for anything other
than an open hearing. Moreover, the interest of the public in ensuring that the
government's death penalty apparatus functions properly can hardly be
gainsaid. Most of the facts of the crime and the indignities suffered by the
victims are likely to have already been made public through trial and appellate
proceedings. However, in limited circumstances judicial proceedings are closed
to the public. 239 Thus, on rare occasions and upon a proper showing, it may be
appropriate to limit public access to the truth forum proceedings. Truth forum
deliberations, like the deliberations of juries, are not open to the public.
IV. LOCATING THE TRUTH FORUM

Having discussed the operation of the truth forum, the next question is
whether the truth forum should be located in the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch. At first blush, it seems like it would fit comfortably within any
branch of government. As described in Part III.D., the truth forum has features
that appear to be adjudicatory (and therefore appropriately placed within the
judicial branch); it could help the executive branch fulfill its prosecutorial
obligations in deciding whether to continue with a scheduled execution 240 or
whether clemency or commutation is appropriate; finally the truth forum could
be viewed as a fact-finding tribunal, the results of which could justify the
passage of legislation prohibiting the prisoner's execution and maybe ordering
his or her release. To avoid concerns that a forum not in the judicial branch will
exercise adjudicatory powers, if placed outside of the judicial branch the forum
should be called a truth commission or truth committee; commissions and
committees, of course, are proper within the executive and legislative branches.

238. Cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 314, 361-69 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(maintaining that the United States public is generally uninformed about the death penalty's
purposes and liabilities and that if fully informed on those issues it would not support capital
punishment).
239. See e.g., Woods v. Kuhlman, 977 F.2d 74 (2d Cir 1992).
240. Prosecutors have legal and ethical obligations to ensure that they are not prosecuting
the innocent. See Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of
Prosecutorsin Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 389,
406-08 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After
Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REv. 171 (2005) (outlining issues and possible answers to dilemmas
prosecutors might face after securing a criminal conviction).

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:51 1

A. Separation of PowersDoctrine Under the Tennessee Constitution
24 1

The Tennessee Constitution divides the government into three branches:
the executive, 242 legislative, 243 and judicial. 244 The Constitution limits each
branch by mandating the separation of powers in declaring that "[n]o person or
persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers
properly belonging
to either of the others, except in the cases herein directed or
245
permitted.91

In our modem society, the branches are not always so easily cabined. The
executive branch has administrative agencies, which set rules (that have the
force of law, like statutes) and hold hearings and hear appeals of agency
determinations. 24 Agency rules have the caste of lawmaking, and hearings and
appeals appear to be adjudicatory. Similarly, courts are allowed to establish
their procedural and evidentiary rules, which seem like lawmaking efforts.247
The executive branch essentially engages in both lawmaking and adjudication
in interpreting the law and choosing which laws to enforce. The question is
whether a truth forum can properly be placed in one branch of the government
and issue verdicts that would prevent the executive branch from executing a
condemned prisoner deemed factually innocent. The question does not lend
itself to an easy answer, but one has to decide if the separation of powers
doctrine permits the practice.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has outlined the general contours of the
separation of powers doctrine under the state constitution. Very much like its
federal counterpart, 48 the Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted a practical or
241. Article II, section 1, declares: "The powers of the Government shall be divided into
three distinct departments: the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial." TENN. CONST.art. II, § 1.
242. Article III, section 1, states: "The Supreme Executive Power of this State shall be
vested in a Governor." TENN. CONST. art. III, § 3.
243. Article II, section 3, reads, in part: "The Legislative authority of this State shall be
vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives,
both dependent on the people." TENN. CONST. art. II, § 3.
244. Article VI, section 1, declares: "The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and such Circuit, Chancery and other inferior courts as the Legislature shall
from time to time, ordain and establish; in the Judges thereof, and in Justices of the peace. The
legislature may also vest such jurisdiction in corporation courts as may be deemed necessary.
Courts to be holden by Justices of the Peach may also be established." TENN. CONST. art. VI, §
1.
245. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 2.
246. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983).
247. See Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory ofFederalCommon Law, 100 Nw. L.
REV. 585, 590 (2006).
248. Modern federal separation of powers doctrine is often classified as either functional or
formalistic. The formalistic approach emphasizes the separate branches of government, while
the functional approach focuses on the "core" function of each branch. See, e.g., Rachel E.
Barkow, SeparationofPowers andthe CriminalLaw, 58 STAN. L. REv. 989 (2006) (criticizing
widespread application of functional approach and advancing formalistic approach when the
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functional approach and at times a more formal approach to resolving
separation of powers challenges. The functional approach is reflected in the
Court's statements that "[tihe Constitution does not define in express terms
what are legislative, executive, orjudicial powers. Theoretically, the legislative
power is the authority to make, order, and repeal, the executive, that 249
to
administer and enforce, and the judicial, that to interpret and apply laws."
Though "[separation of powers] is a fundamental principle of American
constitutional government... it has long been recognized that it is impossible
to preserve perfectly the theoretical lines of demarcation between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches250of government ....
certain amount of overlapping.'

There is necessarily a

In applying this practical approach, the Court has determined that "[a]
legislative enactment which does not frustrate or interfere with the adjudicative
function of the courts does not constitute an impressible encroachment upon the
judicial branch of government." 251 The Court has also noted that the legislature
cannot delegate its power to make laws, but it can enact a law that delegates the
finding of certain facts for the law to apply. 252 The Court has upheld against
challenges of an overbroad delegation of power the creation of a housing
authority, with the power to exercise "all of the powers necessary and
convenient to carry out and effectuate" the law, the power to define individuals
eligible for assistance under the law, and the power to determine which
mortgages to acquire and the terms of the homeowner's mortgage payments.253
Notwithstanding the practical approach, the separation of powers doctrine
retains vitality, particularly when the Court takes more of a formalistic view of
the powers of the respective branches. For instance, the Court has noted that "a
legislative action vesting executive branch agencies with the authority to
determine the constitutionality of statutes" would violate the separation of
powers because assessing the constitutionality of a law is ajudicial and not an

criminal law and its processes are implicated); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and
Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (2001) (criticizing current
separation of powers doctrine and proffering a reconstructed approach); Bruce G. Peabody &
John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separationof Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1
(2003) (proposing a new conception of the separation of powers doctrine that moves beyond
current approaches); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "IfAngels Were to Govern ": The
Need for PragmaticFormalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991)
(advocating a more vigorous enforcement of separation of powers principles and proposing that
no branch exercise authority found outside of its constitutionally defined powers); Peter L.
Strauss, Formal and FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestion-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1987) (exploring the different approaches and
searching for manageable standards that would produce consistent results).
249. Richardson v. Young, 125 S.W. 664, 668 (Tenn. 1910).
250. Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. 1975).
251. Id.
252. Gamble v. State, 333 S.W.2d 816, 821 (Tenn. 1960).
253. West v. Tenn. Hous. Dev. Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275, 280-82 (Tenn. 1974).
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executive function. 25 4 Further, a party cannot be forced - by either the
executive agency or the legislature - to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing a facial constitutional challenge in court. 255 Executive agencies "are
authorized, however, to determine the constitutionality of the applicable statutes
or rules and the procedures employed," with the agency's determination subject
to judicial review.256 The Court has also held that the legislature has the power
to enact rules of evidence in furtherance of its ability to enact substantive law,
while the courts have the inherent power to promulgate rules governing the
practice and procedure in the state courts.257 Courts will defer out of comity to
legislation in this area when those laws are reasonable and workable and
supplement the rules already adopted by the Supreme Court.258 However,
legislation that usurps the power of the courts to determine the admissibility of
evidence violates the separation of powers doctrine.259
B. Respective Branches of Government
This section considers the appropriateness of placing a truth forum within
the different branches of government. A forum for assessing the truth of a
capital defendant's claim of factual innocence can conceivably reside in any
branch of government. However, such a forum is likely to be most appropriate
if placed within the judicial branch.
1. Executive Branch
The most administratively convenient location would be to place the truth
forum in the executive branch. No other branch -judicial or legislative - would
have to authorize such proceedings. Tennessee's Governor, with the nod of his
or her head and the stroke of his or her pen could by executive order create the
proceedings. It could arguably fall under the Governor's clemency power.
Article III, section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution confers on the
Govemor broad clemency powers. 260 The placement of the truth forum in the
executive branch, by either executive order or statute, seems like a natural and
logical fit. Though the General Assembly has enacted statutes regulating
clemency and pardons,2 61 those laws only supplement the Governor's
254. Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tenn. 1995).
255. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 844-45 (Tenn. 2008).
256. Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 455.
257. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 480-81 (Tenn. 2001).
258. Id. at481.
259. Id. at 483-85.
260. Article III lists the Governor's powers. TENN. CONST. art. III. Section 6 states: "He
shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons, after conviction, except in cases of
impeachment." TENN. CONST. art. III, § 6.
261. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-27-101 to 40-27-109 (West 2002) (executive clemency);
id. §§ 40-28-101 to 40-28-505 (West 2002) (creating probation, paroles, and pardons process).
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constitutional authority. 262 Further, the Governor's pardon and commutation
power is absolute and cannot be restricted by the General Assembly or the
courts.263 The Governor has legal authority to modify sentences, 26 and there
already exists an executive agency (the Board of Probation and Parole) with
considerable experience in the area.
However, it is somewhat unclear how the current capital clemency process
works in Tennessee. What is known is that the Governor has the sole
constitutional ower to grant or deny clemency, including reprieves and
commutations. There have been five executions since 1977,26 when the
state's death penalty law was declared legally valid.267 Both Governor
Sundquist and Governor Bredesen, the Governors who have presided over
executions, developed the practice of seeking non-binding recommendations
from the Board of Probation and Parole on whether clemency should be granted
in a capital case, provided the defendant seeks such.268 The Board considers
nine specific factors, 269 but it is unclear whether the Governor limits himself or
herself to these factors as well. 270 Furthermore, there is no requirement that the
Governor consider any of the findings of the Board when deciding whether to
grant clemency. 271 The Board's hearings and the prisoner's presentation to the
Governor are usually open to the public.272 Tennessee capital clemency
proceedings before the Board of Probation and Parole have been more of a
canvassing of the trial evidence than a consideration ofwhether the defendant's
post-trial conduct merits an adjustment of sentence. Again, though current
practice is a bit cryptic, for the five executions since 2000, it appears that the
neither Governor Sundquist nor Governor Bredesen would consider any issue
that has been raised in the courts, even if the later courts could not address the
262. See Carroll v. Raney, 953 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tenn. 1997); Ricks v. State, 882 S.W.2d
387, 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
263. See id.
264. See Lemay v. State Dep't of Correction, 29 S.W.3d 483, 485 (Tenn. 2000)
(Governor's commutation power when exercised results in commuted sentence replacing the
one imposed by the original judgment).
265. See TENN. CONST. art. III, § 6; Lemay, 29 S.W.3d at 485.
266. See http://www.state.tn.us/correction/media/tnexecutions.html (Tenn. Dept. of
Correction's official list of Tennessee executions since 1913) (last visited May 28, 2009).
267. See Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765,767 (Tenn. 1979) (Act ofApr. 11, 1977, Ch.
51, 1977 Tenn. Pub. Acts 92, which authorized the death penalty, does not violate the cruel and
unusual punishment provision of the Tennessee or United States Constitution); Miller v. State,
584 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tenn. 1979) (ex post facto provision of the Tennessee Constitution
required reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment, which was the most serious legally
available punishment when the crime occurred).
268.
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269.
270.
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Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 216, 227-28 & n.95.

18.

PROJECT,

supranote 5, at 217-

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:511

merits of the issue because of a procedural bar.273 This development is
unnecessary and constricts the scope of clemency proceedings. The clemency
process has historically been more open-ended than the judicial process, which
has meant fewer restrictions by court rules and processes, including the
consideration of evidence not otherwise admissible in court. 7 4 It is in areas
such as the consideration of judicially defaulted claims and evidence not
admissible in court that a truth forum process could have its greatest impact.
Nonetheless, one concern is whether, in placing the truth forum in the
executive branch, the practical result will differ from the current clemency
process. Nationwide, for the last twenty years, clemency has generally not been
a successful path for relief for capital defendants. 275Tennessee has followed the
national trend as no capital defendant has been granted clemency in that
time. 276 Even if the truth forum finds that the prisoner is innocent of the capital
offense, it does not appear that the Governor would be bound to grant clemency
because of that finding. The United States Supreme Court has declared that
clemency is solely committed to the discretion of the executive, with few
federal constitutional protections.277 The Tennessee Supreme Court has also
underscored that the Governor's clemency power is derived from the
Constitution and cannot be reduced by the General Assembly;278 thus the
Governor cannot be told upon whom to grant clemency. In short, though
placing the truth forum in the executive branch would appear to be consistent
with established law and procedure, it is rather unlikely that, absent an
amendment to the Tennessee Constitution modifying the exclusiveness of the
Governor's clemency authority, making the truth forum a part of the clemency
process will result in more meaningful review of late asserted claims of factual
innocence.

273. Id. at 220-24.
274. See CATHLEEN BURNETr, JUSTICE DENIED: CLEMENCY APPEALS IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES 158 (2002) (list of twelve non-exhaustive reasons traditionally given for exercising
clemency).
275. From 1977 through May 2009, 1165 death row inmates have been executed. See
Death Penalty Information Center, Clemency, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions (last visited May 22, 2009). During that time, 245 death row inmates received
executive clemency, including 167 commutations and four pardons granted by Illinois Governor
George Ryan in 2003. See Death Penalty Information Center, Clemency, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency (last visited May 22, 2009).
276. ABA DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, supranote 5, at 223;
see also SARAT, supra note 5, at 181, app. B.
277. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285 (1998) (plurality); see
also Workman v. Summers, 136 F. Supp. 2d 896, 899 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to Tennessee's clemency process).
278. See Carroll v. Raney, 953 S.W.2d 657,659 (Tenn. 1997); Ricks v. State, 882 S.W.2d
387, 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
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2. Legislative Branch
The truth forum might also be placed in the legislative branch under the
control of the General Assembly. The legislature has broad investigatory and
subpoena powers, 279 which are attractive attributes for placing a truth
proceeding there perhaps in one of its standing committees or in a specifically
designated subcommittee. Indeed, it could be that the major investigative work
on factual innocence in particular capital cases is performed by legislative staff.
However, placing the truth forum in the legislature raises concerns, including
the need for a majority of both the House and the Senate to agree before the
General Assembly can act with the force of law.2 80 Additionally, it is
challenging to imagine that any legislative activity on the death penalty will not
be overly influenced by political concerns and lose its focus on uncovering the
truth.
Another challenge is the relief the General Assembly could order upon
finding that a capital prisoner was factually innocent. The most obvious remedy
would be the passage of a private bill, prohibiting the prisoner's execution.
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court has declared that the General
Assembly cannot adjudicate legal issues.281 The legislature is also prohibited
from directing the discharge of a defendant, 282 though it can require the
payment of court costs as a precondition of dismissal of criminal charges. 83
Declaring that a once-valid court judgment is now invalid and therefore cannot
be fulfilled seems to be a quintessential judicial act. The Court has noted,
however, that the General Assembly can enact laws that reduce sentences that
were imposed after the law was enacted.2 84 Accordingly, any law that the
General Assembly enacts for factually innocent capital prisoners would, in the
absence of a constitutional requirement,28 5 have to apply prospectively only to
death sentences imposed after its enactment.
279. See Op. Tenn. Atty. Gen. 84-109 (Apr. 2, 1984) (discussing, among other things,
General Assembly's power to investigate through issuance of subpoenas).
280. See TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 17-2 1; TENN. CONST. art. III, § 18 (outlining process
necessary to enact legislation or pass joint resolutions or orders).
281. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473,483 (Tenn. 2001); Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d
45, 47 (Tenn. 1975).
282. State v. Fleming, 26 Tenn. 152, 154 (Tenn. 1846).
283. State v. Costen, 213 S.W. 910, 911-12 (Tenn. 1919).
284. See Howe v. State, 98 S.W.2d 93, 94 (Tenn. 1936).
285. A court may one day rule that the Tennessee or United States Constitution prohibits
the execution of a factually innocent person. The Tennessee Supreme Court has not addressed
whether the Tennessee Constitution prohibits the execution of the factually innocent. See
Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282,290 n.4 (Tenn. 2009) (declining to reach issue); Workman
v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 104 (Tenn. 2001) (Anderson, J., & Barker, J., dissenting) (assuming
without deciding that state constitution prohibits the execution of an innocent person). The
United States Supreme Court in Herrerav. Collins seems to say that such an execution would
not violate the federal constitution, but a majority of the Court nonetheless went on to assess the
strength of the evidence before it. See Part 1.4.a., supra.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:511

Even if the General Assembly is not the branch in which the truth forum
resides or it does not conduct an investigation into the issue of factual
innocence, it still might play a critical role in bringing into fruition the truth
forum. In fact, that body has already made a limited foray in this area. In 1995,
the General Assembly passed a statute that allows the submission of postconviction petitions based on new scientific evidence establishing actual
innocence.286 This was important because other post-conviction petitions must
be brought within one year of the end of direct appeals.287 There is no statute of
limitations for these new scientific post-conviction petitions.28 8 In essence, the
General Assembly said that claims based on scientific evidence are sufficiently
important that they can be brought even when they are made late in the capital
litigation process. The lacuna in the law, however, is that capital defendants
who claim to be factually innocent, but whose cases do not rely on scientific
evidence, like DNA, do not have a meaningful forum in which to have their
claim adjudicated.
The General Assembly has enacted comprehensive legislation on executive
clemency, probation, pardons, paroles, and post-conviction relief.289 Most of
this legislation may not be required, at least under the United States
Constitution. The clemency and the probation, pardons, and paroles legislation
is largely advisory as the General Assembly cannot infringe on the Governor's
constitutional authority in this area.290 It now appears that the state does not
have to have a post-conviction process. 291 That all these laws still exist may
A case currently before the federal high court, DistrictAttorney's Officefor the ThirdJudicial
Districtv. Osborne, No. 08-06, raises the issue of whether there is a federal due process right to
the state's biological evidence so that DNA-based tests can be performed to buttress a prisoner's
claim of actual innocence. The Court's decision may clarify whether the federal constitution
prohibits the execution of the factually innocent and whether federal law provides a means by
which the prisoner can acquire biological evidence that might undermine the conviction.
286. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(b) (West 2008) (exempting post-conviction
petitions from one year statute of limitations when a "claim in the petition is based upon new
scientific evidence establishing that the petitioner is actually innocent of the offense or offenses
for which the petitioner was convicted"); id. § 40-30-117(a)(2) (West 2008) (permitting the
filing of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition if the "claim in the motion is based upon
new scientific evidence establishing that the petitioner is actually innocent of the offense or
offenses for which the petitioner was convicted").
287. See id. § 40-30-102(b)(2).
288. Id.; see Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn. 2009).
289. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-27-101 to 40-27-109 (West Supp. 2009) (executive
clemency); id. §§ 40-28-101 to 40-28-505 (West Supp. 2009) (probation, paroles, and pardons
process); id. §§ 40-30-101 to 40-30-122 (West Supp. 2009) (post-conviction procedure
process).
290. See Carroll v. Raney, 953 S.W.2d 657,659 (Tenn. 1997); Ricks v. State, 882 S.W.2d
387, 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
291. CompareCase v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336(1965) (remanding for further proceedings
in light of newly enacted state post-conviction procedure law); id. at 337 (Clark, J., concurring)
(due process requires the state to establish a post-conviction proceeding for the vindication of
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indicate that Tennesseans are willing to go further than the narrowest
understanding of due process for the criminally convicted.
Nonetheless, two statutes within the clemency laws deserve special
mention. The first is Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-27-106, which
authorizes the Tennessee Supreme Court to recommend that the Governor
commute a death sentence to life imprisonment.292 When originally enacted in
1838, the Court's certification was binding, that is, the Governor had to
commute the death sentence.293 However, in 1858, in the first official
federal rights); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235,235-39 (1949) (intimating federal constitution
required states to provide adequate post-conviction procedures that protected a criminal
defendant's federal rights) with Murray v. Giarranto, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality) (applying
Finley to state capital case and stating that federal due process does not require state postconviction proceedings) and Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (federal due
process does not require states to provide post-conviction proceeding). But see Christopher
Flood, Closing the Circle:Case v. Nebraska and the FutureofHabeasReform, 27 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 633 (2002) (arguing that the issue of whether there is a constitutional right to
a state post-conviction process remains an open question); Eric M. Freedman, Giarranto is a
Scarecrow: The Right to Counselin State CapitalPostconvictionProceedings,91 CORNELL L.
REV. 1079 (2006) (documenting practices in death penalty jurisdictions and noting changes in
the legal landscape to suggest that Giarrantoshould not be followed).
The most complete history of the state's post-conviction law notes that it was passed in
response to Case. See Gary L. Anderson, Post-ConvictionReliefin Tennessee- FourteenYears
of JudicialAdministration Under the Post-ConvictionProcedureAct, 48 TENN. L. REv. 605,
606-13 (1981).
292. That statute reads: "The governor may, likewise, commute the punishment from death
to imprisonment for life, upon the certificate of the supreme court, entered on the minutes of the
court, that in its opinion, there were extenuating circumstances attending the case, and that the
punishment ought to be commuted." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-106 (West 2008).
293. The law read:
Be it enactedby the GeneralAssembly of the State of Tennessee, That is all cases where
any person or persons now under sentence of death, for the crime of murder in the first
degree, and the judgment of the circuit court has been, or hereafter may be affirmed in the
supreme court ifthejudges of the supreme court shall certify to the governor of the State,
that there were, in their opinion, extenuatingcircumstancesattendingthe case, andthat in
their opinion the punishment ofdeath ought to be commuted to imprisonmentforlife in the
Penitentiaryof the State, then and in such case it is hereby made the duty of the governor
to commute the sentence accordingly,by directingthe sheriffofthe county in whose hands
the execution may be, in writingto that effect, which facts shall be returnedby the sheriff
in the execution, providedalways that the certificate of the supreme court shallbe entered
of record in the minutes of said court; and in all cases hereafter to be tried, where any
person is convicted of murder in the first degree, if the jury who try him should be of
opinion that there were mitigating circumstances in the case, and shall so state in their
verdict, then and in such case it shall be the duty of the court to sentence the defendant to
confinement in the Penitentiary for life; providedalso, that where the supreme court has
adjourned during the term at which said judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, to meet
again before the next regular term of said supreme court, and the execution is to take place
in the interval of adjournment, then and in that case any one of the judges of said supreme
court, shall supersede said execution, until the meeting of said court.
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codification of state law,294 the law was changed from "and in such case it is
hereby made the duty of the governor to commute the sentence accordingly" to
"the Governor may, likewise, commute the punishment from death to
imprisonment for life." 295 In 1859, in Lewis v. State, which challenged a similar
modification making the jury's finding of extenuating circumstances no longer
binding but advisory the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the Act of 1838
had been repealed by the General Assembly's approval of the Code of 1858.296
Lewis' holding does allow the statute to survive by avoiding the
constitutional separation of powers question of whether the Tennessee Supreme
Court can direct the Governor's exercise of clemency.29 7 The holding also
comes close to making the statute meaningless because Tennessee Supreme
Court justices have, without the statute, an inherent authority to recommend
clemency to the Governor. For example, the Court has issued opinions, in
capital and non-capital cases, in which it has affirmed convictions and made
non-binding recommendations of commutation or clemency. 298 In addition,
from 1890 through 1955, likely when mental health assessments and
commitment procedures didn't exist, the Court exercised a form of binding
commutation to the executive branch by using its common law authority to
order the transfer of insane convicted defendants to mental health facilities.299
The second statute worth mentioning is Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-27-109, which authorizes the Governor to grant exoneration to any person

Act of Jan. 10, 1838, ch. 29, 1837-38 Tenn. Pub. Acts 55, § 1 (emphasis added).
294. Samuel C. Williams, Historyof Codificationin Tennessee (pt.1), 10 TENN.L. REV.
61, 69-78 (1932) (discussing the creation of the 1858 Code).
295. See CODE OF TENNESSEE § 5259, at 930 (Return J. Meigs & William F. Cooper eds.,
E.G. Eastman & Co. 1858).
296. Lewisv. State, 40 Tenn. 127, 149-50(Tenn. 1859) (relying in part on § 41 of 1858
Code, which repealed all prior public acts passed prior to the 1857-58 legislative session).
297. Years later the Tennessee Supreme Court announced that the Governor's pardon
power could not be regulated or controlled by another branch of government. State v. Dalton,
109 Tenn. 544 (Tenn. 1903).
298. See, e.g., Bass v. State, 231 S.W.2d 707,715 (Tenn. 1950) (recommending executive
clemency to reduce death sentence to life imprisonment); Temples v. State, 194 S.W.2d 332,
335 (Tenn. 1946) (recommending executive clemency in voluntary manslaughter case); Freddo
v. State. 155 S.W. 171, 173 (Tenn. 1913) (recommending executive clemency in second-degree
murder case); Spence v. State, 83 Tenn. 539 (Tenn. 1885) (recommending commutation of
death sentence for first-degree murder conviction); State v. Becton, 66 Tenn. 138 (Tenn. 1874)
(recommending commutation from death to life imprisonment for robbery conviction).
299. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 383 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tenn. 1964) (recommending
executive commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment so defendant could be transferred
for treatment of his insanity); Ross v. State, 265 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Tenn. 1954) (committing
defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter to mental health facility until psychiatrist
certifies he is able to advise counsel and testify in own behalf); Green v. State, 88 Tenn. 634
(Tenn. 1890) (recommending executive commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment so
the defendant could be transferred to a mental hospital).
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who did not commit the crime for which they were convicted. 300 This law is
unnecessaryoas the Governor's constitutional clemency power already includes
this power.
Neither statute, however, has been the subject of extensive judicial analysis
or commentary. The certification statute may nonetheless reflect the concern
that not every condemned prisoner should be executed, and the exoneration
statute may recognize that the criminal litigation process does produce wrongful
convictions. They both are worth retaining, and to their company should be
added a statute that authorizes a truth forum in which capital defendants can
raise factual innocence claims late in the criminal litigation process.
3. Judicial Branch
The final branch in which to place the truth forum is the judiciary, where it
would serve as a truth jury. This placement too seems like a natural and logical
fit. The truth jury, after all, provides a forum for reviewing the accuracy of a
judicial judgment. Courts are used to reviewing the work and judgments of
other courts. Indeed, a limited review of that sort happens in state and federal
post-conviction proceedings. 0 2 Courts are also traditionally limited forums:
300. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-109 (West Supp. 2009) reads:
(a) After consideration of the facts, circumstances and any newly discovered evidence in a
particular case, the governor may grant exoneration to any person whom the governor finds
did not commit the crime for which the person was convicted. No person may apply for nor
may the governor grant exoneration until the person has exhausted all possible state
judicial remedies.
(b) Exoneration granted pursuant to subsection (a) shall as a matter of law be
unconditional, shall without application having to be made therefor expunge all records of
the person's arrest, indictment and conviction, and shall automatically restore all rights of
citizenship to the person.
(c)(1) The governor has the authority to review and reconsider any pardon the governor has
previously granted for the purpose of determining whether the recipient of the pardon
qualifies for and merits the granting of exoneration in lieu of a pardon. If the governor so
determines, the governor shall have the authority to convert any pardon previously granted
into exoneration as defined by this section.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing the governor from granting
exoneration to a person who applied for a pardon if the person qualifies under subsection
(a) and if the governor determines the person merits exoneration.
301. Rowell v. Dutton, 688 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (noting that the
Governor has pardon power without reference to Board of Paroles and that the Governor can
exercise pardons and the lesser power of commutations and impose conditions, restrictions and
limitations on them).
302. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (providing legal standards for reviewing federal habeas
petitions); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (providing streamlined process for review of state capital
habeas petitions when state meets qualifying requirements); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-102 to
40-30-111 (West 2008) (providing legal standards and process for reviewing state postconviction petitions process); FED. R. APP. P. 24 (outlining process of applying for writ of
habeas corpus and obtaining certificate of appealability).
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they depend on the advocacy and efforts of the lawyers appearing before them,
and they are limited by forensic rules (e.g., rules of procedure, evidence and
attorney ethics).
Perhaps the hope exists that the Tennessee Supreme Court might eventually
interpret the Tennessee Constitution or state laws to recognize an interest of
justice exception to the procedural default rules, 303 which would allow capital
prisoners to raise factual innocence claims. But under the current law and
procedure, claims of innocence not based on scientific evidence basically have
to be brought in a state post-conviction petition. 304 Not only do these petitions
normally have to be filed within a year of the conclusion of the direct appeals,
the claims raised in them are subject to procedural bars.30 5
History suggests that there is a sincere possibility that the General
Assembly may enact a statute authorizing the truth jury. That history shows that
in 1838 the General Assembly passed a statute that was revolutionary: it was
the first law in the nation that permitted the jury to decide whether to sentence
to death a defendant whom it had found guilty of a capital offense. 3°
Overlooked is that this law authorized the Tennessee Supreme Court to issue to
the Governor a binding recommendation of commutation in capital cases.30 7
The current version of this law is at Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-27106.308 Additionally, in 1915, the death penalty for most crimes was
abolished. 309 Two years later this law was repealed. 310 In 1977, Tennessee
enacted a comprehensive comparative proportionality review process as part of
its death penalty.31' If proportionality review had been properly applied by the

303. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 471-72 (Tenn. 2001) (outlining when due
process considerations would mandate the tolling of one-year statute of limitation for the filing
of a post-conviction petition); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 276-79 (Tenn. 2000) (tolling the
one-year statute of limitations for the filing of a post-conviction petition due to petitioner's
mental incompetency); see also Steven J. Mulroy, The Safety Net: Applying Coram Nobis Law
to Prevent the Execution ofthe Innocent, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1 (2003) (using Tennessee
law, among others, to argue that late asserted innocence claims are reviewable under the writ of
coram nobis).
304. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a) (West 2008).
305. See id. § 40-30-106(g), (h) (West 2008); id. § 40-13-102 (West 2008); Ewing v.
State, No. W2004-03007-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 1440474, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30,
2006) (noting procedural bar doctrine and dismissing post-conviction petition as time barred).
306. See Act of Jan. 10, 1838, ch. 29, 1837-38 Tenn. Pub. Acts 55, § 1; see also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 339 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); RAYMOND PATERNOSTER,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 7 (1991) (noting that Tennessee was first U.S. state to give

capital juries sentencing discretion) (same).
307. See Act of Jan. 10, 1838, ch. 29, 1837-38 Tenn. Pub. Acts 55, § 1.
308. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-106 (West 2002).
309. Act ofMar. 28, 1915, ch. 181, 1916 Tenn. Pub. Acts (Acts ofthe Extra Session) 5, §
1.
310. Act ofJan. 31, 1917, ch. 14, 1917 Tenn. Pub. Acts 29, § 1.
311. Act of Apr. 11, 1977, ch. 51,1977 Tenn. Pub. Acts 92, §4.
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courts,3 12 Tennessee's capital punishment process would more rationally ensure
that only the most blameworthy defendants were prosecuted for capital crimes
and sentenced to death. Furthermore, in 1982, ahead of national trends, the
General Assembly prohibited the State from seeking a death sentence for
juveniles.313 Then in 1990, again ahead of national trends, Tennessee enacted a
statute that prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on defendants who
were mentally retarded at the time of the crime. 31 4 So there is a substantial
history of the General Assembly's enacting laws favorable toward capital
defendants well in advance of similar actions by other states. These moderating
measures on the capital punishment seem to indicate that Tennessee does not
312. Comparative proportionality review has not lived up to its promise. The most severe
and persistent critics of the process have been two members of the Court. Justice Reid authored
opinions that noted that, though statutorily required, the Tennessee Supreme Court's
comparative proportionality review was lacking. See State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 527 (Tenn.
1997) (Reid, J., concurring), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 953 (1997); State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d
346, 362 (Tenn. 1997) (Reid, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 999 (1997); State v. Cazes,
875 S.W.2d 253,272 (Tenn. 1994) (Reid, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied,513 U.S. 1086 (1995);
State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 744 (Tenn. 1994) (Reid, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied,513
U.S. 1114 (1995); State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908,932 (Tenn. 1994) (Reid, J., concurring and
dissenting), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829 (1995); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 271 (Tenn.
1993) (Reid, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994); State v. Hurley, 876 S.W.2d
57, 71 (Tenn. 1993) (Reid, C.J., dissenting); State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 585 (Tenn. 1993)
(Reid, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 960 (1994); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465,
485 (Tenn. 1993) (Reid, C.J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994);
State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 84-85 (Tenn. 1992) (Reid, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 954 (1993); State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 354-55 (Tenn. 1992) (Reid, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 124 (1994).
In 1998, the other members of the Tennessee Supreme Court finally responded these
challenges and articulated some factors relevant to its comparative proportionality
determination. See State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 667 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1083 (1998).
In 2000, another member of the Court began to dissent from the Court's comparative
proportionality analysis. Justice Birch maintained that (1) the proportionality test is "overbroad"
because it only considers factually similar cases in which a death sentence has been imposed; (2)
the pool of cases is inadequate because cases in which a death sentence was not sought or in
which no capital sentencing hearing was held are not included; and (3) the review is too
subjective as "the scope of the analysis [is] . . . amorphous and undefined-expanding,
contracting, and shifting as the analysis moves from case to case." State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d
759, 793 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., dissenting). After filing a number of dissents, Justice Birch
began appending a growing list of citations to his previous dissents to each capital sentence
from which he dissented. See State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 324 (Tenn. 2005) (Birch, J.,
dissenting). His most extensive comments on comparative proportionality review are in State v.
Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 629 (Tenn. 2003) (Birch, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 541 U.S.
1049 (2004), Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 793 (Birch, J., dissenting), and State v. Chalmers, 28
S.W.3d 913, 920 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting).
313. Act of Mar. 18, 1982, ch. 638, 1982 Ten. Pub. Acts 142, § 1.
314. Act of Apr. 12, 1990, ch. 1038, 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 730, §1.
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share the mindset of its Southern counterparts. 1 5 Let us hope that that same
sense of moderation and pragmatism is present and effectual to prevent the
execution of the factually innocent in Tennessee.
V. CONCLUSION

The claim that innocents may be executed is not new; what is relatively
new is the possibility that proof of a wrongful conviction might be established
before the prisoner is executed. Under current law it is entirely possible that a
factually innocent person can be executed in Tennessee. When capital prisoners
assert their innocence they are essentially claiming that there is now a serious
reason to question the outcome - the truthfulness - of the original trial. A
modest step in addressing - and perhaps definitively resolving - a condemned
inmate's claim of innocence would be the creation of a forum in which the
innocence claim could be assessed. That forum - perhaps a truth jury or truth
commission - is something that the General Assembly could authorize by
statute. Alternatively, the Governor would create such a process when
reviewing requests for clemency from capital defendants.

315. See GARY WAYNE ANDERSON, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE BORDER SoUTH, DEEP
SOUTH AND TENNESSEE: AN ATTEMTr TO EXPLAIN PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR (unpublished M.A.

thesis 1991, Univ. of Tenn., Knoxville) (on file with Hodges Library, Univ. of Tenn.,
Knoxville) (suggesting Tennessee is more like a Border South state than Deep South state on
capital punishment).

